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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays on the energy efficiency and pricing behavior
of firms in the U.S. automobile market with a focus on Hybrid Electric Vehicles
(HEVs).
The first essay analyzes the market share of HEVs and evaluates consumers’
willingness to pay (WTP) for future fuel cost savings by purchasing fuel efficient
HEVs. Estimates of consumers’ WTP for future fuel cost savings and the finding of
an implicit discount rate of 8.35%∼14.35% suggest that consumers undervalue future
fuel cost savings from purchasing HEVs, and that consumers want a return on their
investment on fuel cost saving HEV technology in 7∼11 years.
The second essay empirically investigates the existence of quality-based price
discrimination in the U.S. automobile market. By estimating a structural model of
demand and supply in the automobile market, I can recover marginal costs, markups
and percentage markups for all vehicle models sold between 2000 and 2013. The
extent of price discrimination is then examined by comparing markup and percentage
markup differences between HEVs and gasoline vehicles. The results demonstrate
that automobile manufactures charge both higher markups and higher percentage
markups on their HEV models. On average, HEVs have higher markups by 11.1%
compared to gasoline vehicles, and Toyota, a leader in the HEV market, charges higher
markups on their HEV models compared to other manufacturers. The Toyota Prius,
the top-selling hybrid car in the U.S. market, particularly enjoys a higher markup
and percentage markup than other competitive vehicles.
v
The third essay provides a model of the automobile market where consumers
have heterogeneous preferences, caring about both the environment and the physical
quality of the product–specifically its fuel economy. Many of the results found by
the model are to be expected: consumers buy fewer vehicles when the environmental
damages (emissions) and prices of vehicles increase; more vehicles are sold when
vehicles are equipped with better fuel technology; and consumers buy fewer vehicles
as they become more pro-environmental. One unexpected finding stands out: a tax on
gasoline vehicles always decreases total emissions, while a subsidy for environmentally
friendly HEV adoption may not.
vi
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Chapter 1
Market Share and Willingness to
Pay for Hybrid Electric Vehicles in
the U.S. Auto Market
1.1 Introduction
Since the first generation of two Hybrid Electric Vehicles (HEVs), Toyota Prius and
Honda Insight, were introduced in the U.S. automobile market in 1999, there has been
growing interest in HEVs. Due to their efficiency and high performance in terms of
fuel economy, people expected that HEVs would be successful in the U.S. market. A
HEV technology uses both a gasoline fueled engine and an electric motor powered by
a rechargeable battery, and provides higher fuel efficiency and fewer emissions than
traditional gasoline-powered vehicles.
These distinctive features of HEVs were attractive to both consumers and policy
makers. Consumers were seeking more fuel efficient vehicles as gasoline prices started
to rise after 2002 (Figure 1.1).
Policy makers have shown concern about the air pollution and energy security
related to automobiles, and paid attention to fuel efficient HEVs. Motor vehicle
1
Figure 1.1: Monthly HEV Market Share and Gasoline Prices
emissions such as carbon monoxide (CO), nitrogen oxide (NO) and sulfur oxide (SO)
are major sources of air pollution. In 2010, it was reported that the transportation
sector alone accounted for 22% of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions and gasoline
consumption accounted for almost 25% of total petroleum production (Bento et al.
2010).
With government’s efforts1 to increase HEV sales and the continuous increase of
gasoline prices, the market share of total light-duty HEVs kept increasing until 2009
(2.80%) but slightly fell off by 2010 because of the after-effects of recession in 2008.
Since then, the HEV market share has started to increase again, and the market share
of new light-duty HEV was 3.23% in 2013 (Figure 1.2).
1Energy Policy Act of 2005 introduced a personal income tax credit up to $3,400 for HEVs. Some
states also have offered various benefits to hybrid owners such as tax incentives, sales tax and fee
exemption, and high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes privileges.
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Figure 1.2: HEV Market Share in the U.S. Automobile Market
Though it has been more than a decade since HEVs were first introduced in the
U.S. automobile market, few studies have been conducted on HEVs. This is partly
due to the relatively recent introduction of HEVs as well as the lack of sufficient data
on HEVs. Most of the studies have focused on the first generation of HEV models (e.g.
Toyota Prius and Honda Insight) and analyzed the determinants of HEV adoption.
This paper aims to analyze market response to fuel efficient HEVs, and to evaluate
whether HEV consumers rationally evaluate increased fuel economy of HEVs. In
particular, this study focuses on the effects of 1) fuel efficiency, 2) price premium,
and 3) federal tax incentives for HEVs on the market share of HEVs, and how
consumers value future fuel cost savings from purchasing fuel efficient HEVs: The
energy paradox.
Early studies of hybrid vehicles investigate the effects of federal and state tax
incentives on hybrid adoptions. However, due to the limited diversity of HEV makes
and models in the market, these studies use aggregate hybrid vehicle sales or the first
3
generation of HEVs, the Prius and the Insight. Gallagher and Muehlegger (2011)
study the effects of government tax incentives, gasoline prices and social preference
for environmental and energy security on the adoption of hybrid vehicles. They
estimated that tax incentives explained a 6% increase, gasoline prices explained a
27% and social preferences explained a 36% increase in hybrid vehicle adoption from
2000 to 2006. From these findings, they finally conclude that recent increase in HEVs
sales is more likely to be the result of increases in the price of gasoline and social
preferences than government tax incentives for HEVs. Kahn (2007) empirically tests
whether environmentalists and non-environmentalists differ with respect to their day-
to-day transportation and consumption patterns. The study finds that households
living in Green Party areas, consume less gasoline, are less likely to purchase SUVs,
and use more public transit. Beresteanu and Li (2011) examine determinants in the
demand for HEVs and evaluate the government policies that aim to promote HEV
sales using cross-sectional new vehicle registration data. Both rising gasoline prices
and government income tax incentive are important factors for explaining HEV sales.
The increase in gasoline prices from $1.53 in 1999 to $2.60 in 2006 explained the
14% increase in HEV sales in 2006. The income tax credit in 2006 accounts for 27%
of hybrid vehicle sales. They also compare the income tax credit program with a
rebate program, and find that a rebate program costs less government revenue in
achieving the same fuel-efficiency of new vehicles. Heutel and Muehlegger (2009)
investigate the diffusion of hybrid vehicles among consumers. They identify the effect
of the penetration rate – total cumulative hybrid sales per capita – on new hybrid
purchases. The focus is the effect of Toyota Prius and Honda Insight penetration
rates on purchases of hybrid cars. They find that there is positive diffusion effect
from the Toyota Prius and negative effect from the Honda Insight. That is, higher
Prius penetration yields higher per capita sales of Toyota HEVs, but penetration of
Insight has a negative effect on the sales of Honda HEVs. Chandra et al. (2010) study
the effect of the tax rebate on HEV sales in Canadian provinces. They found that a
$1,000 increase in the provincial sales tax rebate increases the market share of hybrid
4
cars by 31%∼38%, and 26% of all HEVs sold during the rebate programs could be
attributed to the rebates. Therefore, increased market share of HEVs crowded out
some intermediate cars as well as intermediate SUVs and other high-performance
compact cars. Using cross sectional vehicle choice data from NHTS 2009 survey, Liu
(2014) estimates consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for a hybrid choice, and find
that consumers undervalue HEV features in that WTP is lower than hybrid premium.
This study contributes to recent empirical studies on exploring hybrid vehicle
adoption in that our data set allows us to pair hybrid vehicle models with their
gasoline counterparts (e.g. Toyota Camry and Camry Hybrid) and apply a binary
choice model. This should help to mitigate potential endogenenity problem caused by
correlation between unobserved vehicle attributes and price. One way to overcome
price endogeneity problems is the use of valid instrumental variables. As shall be
seen, hybrid and non-hybrid gasoline counterparts pairs provide a simple method to
address endogeneity. Hybrids and their gasoline counterparts share most of observed
(e.g. length, width, height) and unobserved attributes (e.g. prestige), and these
attributes will be eliminated in the vehicle choice model (Lloro 2012).
In addition, the use of hybrid and non-hybrid pairs allows us to evaluate
consumers’ preference on HEVs by identifying the hedonic value of hybrid vehicle
models versus gasoline vehicles. The hedonic value of HEVs tells us consumers’
subjective evaluation of HEV models. It is important for automobile manufactures
to know consumers’ true valuation of HEVs from a marketing point of a view.
While previous studies have found that the fuel cost saving feature of HEVs is
positively correlated with HEV adoption, none of these studies examines consumers’
true perception of HEV models.
This study also complements an empirical literature on explaining consumers’
valuations of fuel economy. A sizable literature have studied how consumers value
fuel efficiency in automobiles and have investigated the energy paradox. The energy
paradox explains a phenomena where consumers and firms unexpectedly reluctant
to adopt cost saving energy efficient technologies that trade-offs between purchasing
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capital costs and operating costs from the new technology: consumers and firms
undervalue future energy cost savings over the current purchasing cost (Jaffe and
Stavins 1994). Such paradox exists in automobile market that consumers substantially
undervalue future fuel costs in their choices of vehicles.
Greene (2010) reviews twenty eight recent empirical studies on consumers’
valuation of future fuel costs and reaches to the conflicting results that there is
no general consensus among studies.2 A number recent of studies have found that
consumers rationally or slightly undervalue fuel economy. Sallee et al. (2009) combine
micro-level data on used car transaction with fuel economy and gasoline prices to
examine the effect of a gasoline prices on used car prices. The study estimate that
consumers match one dollar future gasoline savings with 79 cents of used car prices
which is consistent with the undervaluation of fuel economy. Klier and Linn (2010)
investigate the impacts of gasoline prices on new vehicle sales between 1978 and 2007
to estimate consumers’ valuation of fuel economy. After controlling for potential
unobserved consumer and vehicle characteristics, they estimate that a one dollar
increase in the price of gasoline is associated with the 0.8∼1 mpg increase in fuel
economy. Using used passenger vehicle prices and gasoline prices between 1999 to
2008, Allcott and Wozny (2012) find consumers slightly undervalue future fuel costs
when purchasing vehicles. Regression results of vehicle prices on gasoline costs show
that one dollar reduction of future gasoline costs are equivalent to 76 cents in vehicle
purchase price. Busse et al. (2013) examine consumers’ sensitivity of future fuel costs
by estimating effects of gasoline prices on vehicle prices and vehicle sales of different
fuel economies. Using parameter estimates of hedonic regression, they test whether
consumers show myopia about future fuel costs by estimating consumers’ willingness
to pay for expected future fuel costs, and find no evidence of myopia and conclude
that consumers do not undervalue fuel economy. Recent studies by Bento et al. (2012)
and Leard (2014) emphasize the importance of unobserved consumer heterogeneity
2Among twenty eight studies, twelve studies support consumers’ undervaluation of future fuel
savings, eight studies imply consumers equally value fuel economy, and other five studies find
consumers strongly overvalued.
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on the valuation of fuel economy. Bento et al. (2012) point out that failure to account
for heterogeneity results in a downward biased estimates (undervaluation of future
fuel cost savings), and the bias would be larger with greater heterogeneity. Leard
(2014), employing a mixed logit model of new vehicle choices, estimates distribution
of consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for a one dollar fuel cost reduction. The
estimated WTP for fuel cost saving is 97 cents, indicating that average consumers
fully value fuel cost reduction.
When consumers decide between buying a HEV or a traditional gasoline-
powered vehicle, consumers carefully evaluate the trade-off between the expected
future fuel cost savings and higher purchase price of HEVs (Hybrid Premium).
If consumers undervalue future fuel cost savings, corporate average fuel economy
(CAFE) standards could be a more efficient way than gasoline taxes to achieve
environmental protection and energy security in transportation sector, as they require
manufacturers to sell more fuel efficient vehicles. By identifying consumers’ response
to fuel cost savings and price premium of HEVs, this study estimates consumers’
willingness to pay for future fuel cost savings and their corresponding implicit discount
rate, and provides an empirical evidence of consumers’ valuation of energy saving
technology.
Our empirical findings show that both increased fuel economy and federal tax
incentives accelerate hybrid adoption over the sample period. I estimate that
consumers would pay $6.91 and $7.12 to save $1 in annual fuel cost reduction with
implicit discount rate of 14.47% and 14.03%, suggesting that consumers moderately
undervalue future fuel cost savings. Consumers’ hedonic valuation of hybrid models
versus gasoline counterparts show that consumers prefer gasoline vehicles to hybrid
vehicles when expected fuel cost savings and the hybrid premium are exactly balanced.
It turns out that Toyota buyers would have to be paid $2,568.05 to be indifferent
between HEVs and gasoline counterparts. This finding suggests that consumers still
perceive HEVs as novel products and are skeptical about HEV technology when
purchasing new vehicles.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 explains the empirical
model and specification. In Section 1.3, I present the data source. Section 1.4 reports
the estimation results and Section 1.5 draws conclusions from empirical analysis.
1.2 The Model
The binary logit model is applied to investigate the choice of a HEV against a
traditional gasoline-powered counterpart. When a consumer makes a decision whether
to buy a fuel efficient HEV or an alternative gasoline vehicle, the consumer compares
expected fuel cost savings from the fuel efficient HEV technology with higher purchase
price (hybrid premium). In other words, the consumer needs to examine the reduced
operating cost against the additional capital cost of purchasing a fuel efficient HEV.
The binary logit model is used for representing two choices (Train 2009).
A consumer i faces a choice among J alternatives. The consumer would acquire
a certain level of utility from a particular alternative. The level of utility that the
consumer i obtains from option j, Uij, consists of two parts: 1) representative utility
that known by researcher, Vij, and 2) error term which is unknown to researchers,
εij:
Uij = Vij + εij (1.1)
The logit model assumes that the error terms are independently and identically
distributed across choices and individuals, and have a Type I extremely value
distribution. Then the probability density of the error term is
f(εij) = e
−εije−e
−εij
(1.2)
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and the CDF of error term is
F (εj) = e
−e−εj (1.3)
The probability of consumer i’s choosing the alternative j over alternative k is
Pij = Prob(Vij + εij > Vik + εik,∀j 6= k) (1.4)
= Prob(εij < Vij − Vik + εik,∀j 6= k) (1.5)
=
eVij∑J
k=1 e
Vik
(1.6)
Representative utility is specified to be linear combination of a vector of observed
attributes of the choice alternative j, xj. That is
Vij = δ
′
ixij (1.7)
where δ′ are parameters to be estimated. Then, probability of consumer i′s choosing
alternative j becomes
Pij =
eδ
′
ixij∑J
k=1 e
δ′ixik
(1.8)
In this study, a consumer faces two choices; a HEV and straight non-hybrid
gasoline counterpart (e.g. Toyota Camry and Camry Hybrid). An advantage of the
use of hybrid and non-hybrid counterpart pairs is that both observed and unobserved
common attributes between the hybrids and non-hybrid counterparts will be canceled
out in the vehicle choice. Suppose the utility from each type of a vehicle can be written
as
Uih = δ
′
ixih + λZ + εih (1.9)
Uig = δ
′
ixig + λZ + εig (1.10)
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where h and g denote the hybrid and the gasoline counterpart respectively. x is a
vector of distinctive attributes and Z is a vector of common attributes.
Consumer i chooses a hybrid if
Uih > Uig (1.11)
which is equivalent to
Uih − Uig > 0
δ′i(xih − xig) + λ(Z − Z) + (εih − εig) > 0
δ′i(xih − xig) + (εih − εig) > 0
(1.12)
and the common attributes, Z, cancel out in the model of vehicle choice.
If εh and εg are independently and identically distributed, and have Type I extreme
value distributions, the probability of a consumer i′s choosing a hybrid vehicle is
Pih =
eδ
′
ixih
eδ
′
ixih + eδ
′
ixig
=
1
1 + e(δ
′
ixig−δ′ixih)
=
1
1 + e(Vig−Vih)
(1.13)
I assume that n consumers in the market are identical which means consumers do
not differ in their mean utility getting from choice of a hybrid vehicle. We can now
drop subscript i in equations. Also, we can define total HEV sales as
Sh = n× Ph (1.14)
The logit (log of the odds ratio) of the relative market share of hybrid vehicle is
then
log
(
Sh
1− Sh
)
= log
(
Sh
Sg
)
= Vh − Vg = δ′xh − δ′xg (1.15)
where Sh denotes the total HEV sales and Sg denotes the total gasoline vehicle sales.
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I assume that hybrid and non-hybrid counterpart vehicles differ in fuel economy
and purchase prices. Then, our base empirical model (Model I) is given by
log
(
Shkt
Sgkt
)
= δ1Effikt + δ2Premiumkt + δ3Taxcreditkt + δ4jdj + φt + kt (1.16)
where Shkt and Sgkt respectively represent the HEV and non-hybrid gasoline
counterpart sales for vehicle model k in time t. Effikt is annual fuel cost savings
of HEVs ($). This measures the difference of annual fuel costs between HEVs and
gasoline vehicles which is defined as
Effikt =
[
Pgt
MPGhk
− Pgt
MPGgk
]
× VMTt (1.17)
where Pgt is monthly gasoline prices, MPGhk and MPGgk are fuel economy (miles
per gallon) of HEVs and gasoline vehicles, and VMTt is average of annual vehicle
miles traveled. Premiumkt is the price premium of the HEV model k in time t. This
variable is defined as the retail price difference between the HEV model k and its
gasoline counterpart. (e.g. Retail price difference between Civic hybrid and Civic
gasoline vehicle). Taxcreditkt is federal income tax credit for selective HEV models.
Finally, dj and φt are manufacturer specific and time fixed effects.
Since higher fuel cost savings of HEVs are attractive to consumes, we can expect
a positive sign on δ1. However the price premium on HEVs lowers market share
of HEVs and we can expect negative sign on δ2. Federal tax credit would help
consumers to buy hybrid vehicles and is expected to have a positive sign of coefficient
(δ3). The coefficient δ4j represents consumers’ preference for HEV models produced
by manufacturer j, holding other things constant. Positive signs on δ4j indicate that
consumers prefer HEVs to gasoline vehicles, and consumers are indifferent if δ4j are
close to zero.
Note that Model I (Equation (1.16)) does not take into account the fact that
future fuel cost savings will be discounted over time. If we assume that the discount
11
rate of fuel cost savings is r, the vehicle utilization rate is m(t), and vehicle lifetime
is, L, then the present value of future fuel cost savings can be expressed as
Effi =
∫ L
t=0
[
Pg(t)
MPGhk
− Pg(t)
MPGgk
]
m(t)e−rtdt (1.18)
I further assume that the the price of gasoline follows a random walk so that best
prediction of future gasoline prices are current gasoline prices (Klier and Linn 2010).
Integrating Equation (1.18) over time yields
Effi =
m
r
[
Pg(t)
MPGhk
− Pg(t)
MPGgk
]
(1− e−rL) (1.19)
Plugging Equation (1.19) into Equation (1.16) yields following estimation equation
(Model II):
log
(
Shkt
Sgkt
)
= γ1
[m
r
Effikt(1− e−rL)− Premiumkt − Taxcreditkt
]
+ γ2jdj + φt + ηkt
(1.20)
where dj are manufacturer specific dummy variables.
The bracket in Equation (1.20) is the difference between discounted fuel cost
savings and additional cost of purchasing a HEV. This can be explained as the
‘Net Cost’ of purchasing a HEV. The magnitude of γ1 measures the consumers’
importance on trade-off between fuel cost savings and additional purchasing cost
of HEVs, namely consumers’ trade-off between the reducing operating cost and
additional capital cost of purchasing fuel efficient HEV technology. Larger γ1 implies
consumers put significant weight on the trade-off between operating and capital
cost. Since higher discounted fuel cost savings would decrease the net cost of HEV
purchase, we can expect positive sign on γ1. Again, The coefficient γ2j represent the
consumers’ hedonic valuation of HEV choice produced by manufacturer j. In addition
to parameters above, implicit discount rate, ′r′ is also estimated using nonlinear
leastsquares estimation.
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1.3 DATA
1.3.1 Vehicle Sales Data
The primary data for this study is monthly total new car and light-truck sales in
the U.S. automobile market. This data was obtained from the Automotive News
Data center and covers from January 2000 to December 2013. However, Automotive
News Data Center does not include HEV sales data. Therefore, HEV sales data was
separately collected from Hybridcars.com. Finally, the data set contains 43 HEV and
gasoline counterparts pairs produced by 15 manufactures from 2000 to 2013. Using
vehicle sales data, I calculate the odds ratio of each HEV model i by dividing the
number of HEV sales by the number of gasoline counterpart sales for each model i.
1.3.2 Gasoline Prices, Fuel Economy, Vehicle Price and HEV
Tax Credit
Monthly regular retail gasoline prices are obtained from the Energy Information
Administration (EIA). To calculate the annual fuel costs of each vehicle model, I
collected fuel economy (EPA combined miles per gallon of gasoline) data from AOL
Autos. Fuel cost per mile is calculated by retail gasoline prices divided by fuel
economy. Finally, average annual vehicle miles traveled (EIA, Annual Energy Outlook
2013) is multiplied to calculate annual fuel costs ($). Manufacture’s suggested retail
price (MSRP) of vehicle models are also obtained from AOL Autos. Price premium
(additional purchase cost) of HEV is the retail price difference between the HEV and
gasoline models of the same vehicle. (e.g. MSRP difference between Civic hybrid
and Civic gasoline vehicle). Table 1.1 compares fuel economy, annual fuel cost saving
and price premium of top 10 best selling HEVs and non-hybrid gasoline counterparts
in 2013. Information about the federal tax credit for HEVs is obtained from the
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U.S.Department of Energy, Fuel Economy Guide. All prices are adjusted to year
2012 dollars.
Table 1.1: Top 10 Best-Selling HEVs and Non-hybrid Gasoline Counterparts (2013)
Year Make & Model MPG
MPG
Differ-
ence
Annual
Fuel
Cost
Savings
Price
($2012)
Price
Premium
2013 Toyota Prius 49.7
16.6 $416.8
$23,784.8
$4,865.9
2013 Toyota Matrix 33.1 $18,918.9
2013 Toyota Camry Hybrid 41.2
11.7 $396.6
$26,680.5
$3,425.4
2013 Toyota Camry 29.5 $23,255.1
2013 Ford Fusion Hybrid 47.0
19.6 $627.0
$27,824.0
$3,311.6
2013 Ford Fusion 27.4 $24,512.4
2013 Hyundai Sonata Hybrid 37.3
8.3 $317.1
$26,541.9
$1,683.0
2013 Hyundai Sonata 29.0 $24,858.9
2013 Lexus ES-Series Hybrid 39.6
14.1 $573.9
$39,857.4
$2,851.2
2013 Lexus ES-Series 25.5 $37,006.2
2013 Toyota Avalon Hybrid 39.6
14.1 $573.9
$36,001.4
$2,336.4
2013 Toyota Avalon 25.5 $33,665.0
2013 Kia Optima Hybrid 37.8
9.3 $355.6
$26,433.0
$4,356.0
2013 Kia Optima 28.5 $22,077.0
2013 Chevrolet Malibu Hybrid 30.5
0.5 $20.4
$25,834.1
$2,900.7
2013 Chevrolet Malibu 30.0 $22,933.4
2013 Lexus RX-Series Hybrid 30.2
9.0 $583.7
$46,351.8
$6,088.5
2013 Lexus RX-Series 21.2 $40,263.3
2013 Honda Civic Hybrid 44.0
9.9 $273.6
$25,170.8
$1,876.1
2013 Honda Civic 34.1 $23,294.7
Note: There is no exact gasoline counterpart for Toyota Prius. Instead, Toyota matrix is paired
with Prius for comparison following the guidance from Fueleconomy.org.
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1.4 Estimation Results
1.4.1 Model I Estimation Results
Estimation results of Model I (Equation (1.16)) are reported in Table 1.2.
log
(
Shkt
Sgkt
)
= δ1Effikt + δ2Premiumkt + δ3Taxcreditkt + δ4jdj + φt + kt (1.16)
I use two different dependent variables in estimating model I. In specification (1),
I regress the log of monthly HEV sales of vehicle model k in time t, log(Saleskt),
on annual fuel cost savings, price premium of HEV and the federal tax credit.
Specifications (2)–(5) use the logit (log of the odds ratio), log
(
Shkt
Sgkt
)
, as a dependent
variable. In order to track down the effects of federal tax credit on HEV adoption
during the sample period, I interact federal tax credit with time variable in
specifications (3) and (5). In specifications (4) and (5), I include manufacturer dummy
variables to capture manufacturer specific fixed effects.
The estimated coefficient on the Annual Fuel Cost Savings is positive and
significant in all specifications which implies HEV consumers strictly prefer higher fuel
economy of HEVs compared to gasoline counterparts. Better fuel efficient technology
of HEVs would evidently be attractive to consumers and increases the market share.
As expected, the higher purchase price of HEVs has a negative impact (-0.00024) on
the market share of HEVs, but federal tax credit for HEVs are positively correlated
(0.00011) with HEV adoption (Specification (4)). According to the coefficients on
Federal Tax Credit*Time interaction variables in specifications (3) and (5), federal
tax credit actually started to increase the market share of HEVs from 2009 as more
qualified HEVs for federal tax credits are introduced in the market. Coefficients of
each manufacturer dummy variable (δ4j) in specifications (4) and (5) indicate the
consumers’ preferences for HEV models against gasoline counterparts produced by
manufacturer j, holding other factors constant. That is consumers’ hedonic valuation
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Table 1.2: Model I Estimation Results
Dependent Variable log(Saleskt) log
(
Shkt
Sgkt
)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Annual Fuel Cost Savings ($) 0.00268∗∗∗ (0.00024) 0.00275∗∗∗ (0.00023) 0.00275∗∗∗ (0.0002) 0.00168∗∗∗ (0.00022) 0.00174∗∗∗ (0.00023)
Price Premium ($) -0.00015∗∗∗ (0.00001) -0.00016∗∗∗ (0.00001) -0.00016∗∗∗ (0.00001) -0.00024∗∗∗ (0.00001) -0.00024∗∗∗ (0.00001)
Federal Tax Credit ($) 0.00048∗∗ (0.00005) 0.00028∗∗∗ (0.00005) 0.00011∗∗ (0.00005)
Federal Tax Credit ($) 2006 -0.00068∗∗ (0.00028) -0.00028 (0.00024)
Federal Tax Credit ($) 2007 0.00033∗∗ (0.00013) 0.00008 (0.00012)
Federal Tax Credit ($) 2008 0.00071 (0.00013) -0.00015 (0.00010)
Federal Tax Credit ($) 2009 0.00037∗∗∗ (0.00099) 0.00014∗ (0.00009)
Federal Tax Credit ($) 2010 0.00041∗∗∗ (0.00089) 0.00031∗∗∗ (0.00008)
AUDI -0.04373 (0.44549) -0.02911 (0.44446)
BMW -1.5645∗∗∗ (0.31010) -1.5534∗∗∗ (0.30954)
CHRYSLER -2.5886∗∗∗ (0.5798) -2.7565∗∗∗ (0.5798)
MERCEDES-BENZ -2.8043∗∗∗ (0.34585) -2.7002∗∗∗ (0.34758)
FORD -1.0348∗∗∗ (0.25147) -1.1314∗∗∗ (0.25171)
GM -2.2622∗∗∗ (0.25013) -2.2583∗∗∗ (0.24986)
HONDA -2.2426∗∗∗ (0.22800) -2.2240∗∗∗ (0.22732)
HYUNDAI -0.39110 (0.31614) -0.38561 (0.31524)
KIA -0.2034 (0.35881) -0.19931 (0.35783)
LEXUS 0.06082 (0.2857) 0.07099 (0.28570)
MAZDA 0.56268 (0.34641) 0.74234 (0.35258)
NISSAN -1.9185∗∗∗ (0.27052) -1.9205∗∗∗ (0.26976)
PORSCHE -0.60427∗∗ (0.29488) -0.59626∗∗ (0.29430)
TOYOTA -0.63674∗∗ (0.26232) -0.63828∗∗ (0.26291)
VOLKSWAGEN -0.51301 (0.37789) -0.50738 (0.37695)
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES
R-Squared 0.2642 0.1812 0.1907 0.8822 0.8834
Observations 2,008 1,615 1,615 1,615 1,615
Notes:
1. Standard errors in parentheses
2. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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for HEV models when annual fuel cost savings, price premium and federal tax credits
are balanced. Therefore, hedonic value measures consumers’ subjective perception
on HEVs other than fuels cost savings, price premium and federal tax credit. The
estimated coefficients show that all consumers except Audi, Hyundai, Kia, Lexus,
Mazda and Volkswagen clearly prefer gasoline vehicles to HEVs (coefficients are
negative and significant). Audi, Hyundai, KIA, Lexus, Mazda and Volkswagen
consumers are indifferent between HEVs and gasoline counterparts (coefficients are
insignificant). This finding is consistent with the result from Liu (2014) that
consumers’ valuation of the hybrid feature is still low.
1.4.1.1 Willingness to Pay and Implicit Discount Rate for Future Fuel
Cost Savings of HEVs
The estimated coefficients on Annual Fuel Cost Savings and Price Premium in
Table 1.2 provide estimates of consumers’ willingness to pay for $1 reduction in annual
future fuel cost savings from increased fuel economy of HEVs and corresponding
implicit discount rate. This is equivalent to approximately $8.00 in present value
savings, assuming 10 years of vehicle lifetime and annual discount rates of 14.90%.
The point estimates of specifications (4)–(5) in Table 1.2 imply that consumers would
be willing to pay for $6.91 and $7.12 for $1 future fuel cost savings from HEVs,
and corresponding implicit discount rates are 14.47% and 14.03% respectively. See
Table 1.3. The range of estimated implicit discount rates in Table 1.3 is higher than
10-year Treasury rate (3.04%∼5.19%) and national 48-month new auto loan rate
(4.13%∼7.92%), which implies HEV consumers undervalue future fuel cost savings
from purchasing HEVs.3
Our estimates of implicit discount rates are lower than estimated implicit discount
rates of durable goods from previous researches. Hausman (1979) estimates an implied
discount rate of 17%∼27% for air conditioner and Dubin and McFadden (1984) find
310-year Treasury rate between sample periods of 2006 and 2013 was 3.04%∼5.19% and
corresponding 48-month new auto loan rate was 4.13%∼7.92%.
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Table 1.3: Willingness to Pay and Implicit Discount Rate
Specification (4) Specification (5)
Willingness to Pay
$6.91 $7.12
[$4.90 $9.26] [$5.11 $9.50]
Implicit Discount Rate
14.47% 14.03%
[10.83% 20.25%] [10.56% 19.42%]
Notes:
1. 95% confidence interval in brackets.
2. Confidence interval is estimated using parametric bootstrap method.
the discount rate of 20% for water heating system. Greene (1986) uses market share of
diesel and gasoline engine vehicles, and estimates discount rate of 30%∼40% for future
fuel savings. Though discount rates vary by durable goods, these studies including
ours conclude that consumes undervalue future energy costs.
1.4.2 Model II Estimation Results
The estimate of the implicit discount rate, ′r′, in model II (Equation (1.20)) crucially
depends on the assumptions of annual vehicle usage, m, and the lifetime of the vehicle,
L. I use the Energy Information Administration (EIA)’s annual miles traveled over
the sample period (EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2013). Vehicle lifetimes of 5-year,
10-year, 15-year, 20-year and 25-year are used for the estimation, and I report the
estimated discount rate implied by each vehicle lifetime in Table 1.4. The parameters
are estimated by nonlinear least squares.
log
(
Shkt
Sgkt
)
= γ1
[m
r
Effikt(1− e−rL)− Premiumkt − Taxcreditkt
]
+ γ2jdj + φt + ηkt
(1.20)
The coefficient of Net Cost (0.00023) is positive and significant. The coefficient
explains the consumers’ importance of trade-off between fuel cost savings and
additional purchase price of HEVs.
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Table 1.4: Model II Estimation Results
Variables Coefficients
Standard
Errors
95% Confidence
Interval
Net Cost ($) 0.00023∗∗∗ (0.00002)
Discount rate (r) (L=5 Years) -0.11606∗ (0.05933) [-0.2324 0.00031]
Discount rate (r) (L=10 Years) 0.0835∗∗ (0.03771) [0.00961 0.15756]
Discount rate (r) (L=15 Years) 0.12488∗∗∗ (0.03076) [0.06453 0.18523]
Discount rate (r) (L=20 Years) 0.13825∗∗∗ (0.027611) [0.08410 0.19241]
Discount rate (r) (L=25 Years) 0.14346∗∗∗ (0.025981) [0.09250 0.19442]
AUDI -0.13573 (0.44401)
BMW -1.6421∗∗∗ (0.30841)
CHRYSLER -2.7247∗∗∗ (0.5770)
MERCEDES-BENZ -2.920∗∗∗ (0.34213)
FORD -1.0892 (0.25051)
GM -2.3186∗∗∗ (0.24908)
HONDA -2.2353∗∗∗ (0.22824)
HYUNDAI -0.43384 (0.3159)
KIA -0.25588 (0.35842)
LEXUS 0.08627 (0.28582)
MAZDA 0.41388 (0.34000)
NISSAN -2.0129∗∗∗ (0.267)
PORSCHE -0.65793∗∗ (0.29419)
TOYOTA -0.61153∗∗ (0.26237)
VOLKSWAGEN -0.5785 (0.37714)
Year Fixed Effects YES
R-Squared 0.8819
Observations 1,615
Notes:
1. Standard errors in parentheses
2. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The large coefficient implies that buyers put significant weight on the trade-off
between low operating cost and high purchase cost of HEVs. Estimated implicit
discount rates are -11.06%, 8.35%, 12.49%, 13.83%, and 14.35% assuming 5-year,
10-year, 15-year, 20-year and 25-year of vehicle lifetimes respectively. If we take
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15-year vehicle lifetime as the benchmark, implicit discount of 12.49% (8 years
of payback periods) is still above the 10-year Treasury rate (3.04%∼5.19%) and
national 48-month new auto loan rate (4.13%∼7.92%), and consumers still undervalue
future fuel cost savings of fuel efficient HEVs. Coefficients signs of manufacturer
dummy variables (γ2j) are same as in specification (5) in Table 1.2. In particular,
Chrysler (-2.7247) and Mercedes-Benz (-2.920) consumers have a strong preference for
the gasoline vehicle models, and Toyota consumers are nearly indifferent (-0.61153)
between HEVs and gasoline counterparts.
Table 1.5: Estimates of Consumers’ Valuation of HEVs at Zero Net Present Cost
Vehicle Make Valuation ($) 95% Confidence Interval
AUDI $-569.99 [$-4,073.32 $2,933.32]
BMW $-6,896.16 [$-9,816.83 $-3,975.5]
CHRYSLER $-11,442.35 [$-16,394.30 $-6,490.40]
MERCEDES-BENZ $-12,263.40 [$-15,773.76 $-8,753.04]
FORD $-4,574.30 [$-6,529.90 $-2,618.70]
GM $-9,736.70 [$-12,207.32 $-7,266.08]
HONDA $-9,386.90 [$-11,658.10 $-7,115.70]
HYUNDAI $-1,821.85 [$-4,392.27 $748.55]
KIA $-1,074.53 [$-3,916.32 $1,767.24]
LEXUS $362.29 [$-1,617.06 $2,341.65]
MAZDA $1,738.06 [$-859.96 $4,336.08]
NISSAN $-8,453.23 [$-10,946.56 $-5,959.89]
PORSCHE $-2,762.93 [$-5,130.11 $-395.75]
TOYOTA $-2,568.05 [$-4,517.29 $-618.82]
VOLKSWAGEN $-2,429.72 [$-5,462.90 $603.46]
Note: Confidence interval is estimated using parametric bootstrap method.
1.4.3 Monetary Valuation of HEVs
Parameter estimates from Model II are used to compute consumers’ monetary
valuation of HEV choice. Since the coefficient γ2j in Model II represents consumers’
hedonic valuation of HEVs, and the coefficient γ1 represents marginal utility of fuel
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cost savings in dollars, the ratio of γ2j/γ1 represents the consumers’ valuation of HEV
choice in dollars, when discounted fuel cost savings are equal to hybrid premium. The
estimated monetary valuation and corresponding 95% confidence interval are reported
in Table 1.5. I find, on average, Toyota buyers would have to be paid $2,568.05 to be
indifferent between HEVs and gasoline counterparts.
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I employ two binary logit models to analyze the market share of Hybrid
Electric Vehicles (HEVs) utilizing monthly vehicle sales data covering from January
2000 to December 2013. In particular, this paper focuses on consumers’ decisions on
the trade-off between fuel cost savings and higher purchase price of HEVs, and how
this behavior affects the market share of HEVs. 43 HEVs and gasoline counterparts
produced by 15 manufacturers in the U.S. automobile market were investigated.
Our findings from two logit models suggest that fuel efficient HEV technology
together with government support for HEVs promoted the consumer adoption of
HEVs over the sample period. Estimated willingness to pay for future fuel cost savings
and implicit discount rates of 8.35%∼14.35% implies that consumers moderately
undervalue future fuel cost savings from purchasing HEVs, and consumers would
want to get back their investment on fuel cost saving HEV technology in 7∼11 years.4
Consumers’ hedonic valuation of HEV models against gasoline counterparts at net
cost of purchasing HEVs reveal that consumers find HEVs are less desirable than
gasoline counterparts when expected fuel cost savings and hybrid premium are exactly
balanced.
4A rational consumer would discount future fuel cost savings over the vehicle lifetime both simple
discount rate and annual vehicle usage decline rate. Then, the payback period is calculated by
Payback period =
[
1− e−(i+σ)L]
i+ σ
=
1
r
where i is the simple discount rate, σ is the rate of decline in vehicle use with vehicle age, L is the
vehicle lifetime and r is the estimated implicit discount rate.
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Our results contain useful information about explaining the trend in the market
share of HEVs, and provide evidences of how consumers consider trade-off between
operating cost and capital cost when adopting new fuel efficient HEV technology.
We can apply these findings when evaluating advanced vehicle technologies such as
electric vehicles and fuel cell vehicles.
There still exist limitations, and future studies are needed to advance this line of
research. First, when deriving the Model II, I assume that consumers’ expectations
about gasoline prices remain constant over time. However, this is a very strong
assumption. Future study requires that continuous changes of consumers’ expectation
of gasoline prices need to be integrated into the model. Second, our study does not
consider potential consumer heterogeneity. As Bento et al. (2012) pointed out, failing
to control for heterogeneous preferences for future fuel costs results in downward
biased estimate of willingness to pay for fuel economy. Another source of heterogeneity
is consumers’ risk aversion to novel technologies. Since HEV is a new technology, the
adoption of HEVs may vary among consumers’ behavior toward risk aversion, which
in turn affect hedonic valuation of HEVs choices. Incorporating such heterogeneity
will be another area of future work.
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Chapter 2
Identifying Price Discrimination
with Quality Difference: Evidence
from Hybrid Electric Vehicles
2.1 Introduction
The most common practice of price discrimination occurs when firms are selling
the same product at different prices to different consumers. Not only for the same
products, but price discrimination exists when price differences of similar products
do not reflect cost difference. In many markets, firms offer products that have the
similar features with multiple qualities and charge different prices for customers.
A Hybrid Electric Vehicle (HEV) is a good example. A HEV is the higher quality
variant of conventional gasoline vehicle that combines the gasoline engine with an
electric propulsion motor, and provides better fuel economy and emits fewer carbon
emissions. These distinctive benefits of HEVs together with the growing concern of
energy prices and environmental issues have made environmentally friendly consumers
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pay closer attention to HEVs. Early adapters and innovators who desired HEV
technology also showed great interest shortly after the HEVs’ introduction to the
U.S. Market (Heffner et al. 2007). As a result, HEVs market share has continued
increasing since the first HEV model, the Honda Insight, was introduced to the U.S.
automobile market in 1999. There are 39 HEV models in the market and total market
share of HEVs reached 3.23% of total Light-duty Vehicle (Car and Light truck) sales
and 6.28% of total car sales in 2013. A well-established literature has shown that
the popularity of HEVs came from the rising gasoline prices, government support
(Bento et al. 2010; Beresteanu and Li 2011; Sallee 2011; Diamond 2009; Gallagher
and Muehlegger 2011) and environmental concern (Kahn 2007).
However, in order to enjoy the fuel savings benefit of HEVs, consumers have to pay
extra expenses for these vehicles, known as the Hybrid premium.1 Price premium of
HEVs ranges from $2,900 to $11,000 depending on the vehicle model A question then
arises whether the hybrid premium justifies the fuel savings benefit of HEVs. In other
words, can the price premium be explained by the extra cost of producing fuel efficient
HEV technologies (electric propulsion system, battery pack, etc.)? This implies if the
markup of HEVs exceeds that of gasoline vehicles, quality-based price discrimination
against HEV consumers exists. Since HEV consumers have higher willingness to pay
for a HEV choice, manufacturers have an incentive to charge higher markups and
expropriate consumer surplus from those consumers.
The purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate the existence of quality-
based price discrimination against HEV consumers. Using the new vehicle sales data
from 2000 to 2013, I identify the new vehicle demand following random coefficients
discrete choice method taken from the Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) (henceforth
BLP). Marginal cost, markup and percentage markup are recovered by solving
firms’ profit maximization problem assuming that automobile manufacturers are
engaged in Bertrand-Nash competition. Finally, I compare average markups for
1For example, MSRP of Toyota Camry hybrid 2014 model is $26,950 and MSRP of a counterpart
gasoline model is $23,045 which yields hybrid premium of $3,905.
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HEVs and gasoline vehicles to find if manufacturers do engage in quality-based price
discrimination.
I find that, on average, hybrid Light-duty vehicles (LDVs) have both higher
markups and percentage markups than gasoline LDVs. Average markups of hybrid
LDVs and gasoline LDVs between the years 2000 and 2013 are $5,071 and $4,595 and
corresponding percentage markups are 19.19% and 18.33% respectively. In addition,
HEVs are estimated to have 11.09% higher markups than gasoline vehicles. The
results are obtained from all hybrid and gasoline vehicle models in the market.
However, firm’s ability to attach markups depends on its market power: market
share and the number of products produced by the firm. As will be shown, Toyota
has the dominant position in the HEV market. By 2013, Toyota produced 9 HEV
models and accounted for 63.9% of the total HEV market shares. Thus, Toyota’s
pricing strategy on HEVs might be somewhat different from other manufacturers.
From this point, I then compare average markups for Toyota’s HEVs with HEVs
produced by other manufacturers. The evidence reveals that Toyota charges higher
markups and percentage markups on their hybrid models than other manufacturers’
hybrid vehicle models. The Toyota Prius, the top-selling hybrid car particularly
enjoys larger markup than other competing vehicles.
Starting from empirical works by Borenstein (1991) and Shepard (1991), a
considerable amount of literature has investigated evidence of price discrimination in
various industries. Borenstein (1991) tests for price discrimination in gasoline prices
at gas stations by varying availability of leaded and unleaded gasoline and found
that margins for leaded gasoline were higher and competition was less strong in that
market. Similarly, Shepard (1991) compares gas prices at stations with both full-
service and self-service pu mps (multi-product stations) against those that offered
only one of the two options (single-product stations). Although gasoline station
markets were fairly competitive, multi-product stations had strong market power to
price discriminate.
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In the airline industry, Borenstein and Rose (1994) compare the airfares of different
passengers on the same flight. Their findings suggested that substantial fare variations
existed between passengers and the price dispersion increased in more competitive
markets. However, using panel data, Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) reach opposite
results from the findings of Borenstein and Rose (1994). They found that competition
and dispersion had a negative relationship and more competition resulted in less price
dispersion in the airline industry. Clerides (2002) analyzes pricing behavior in the
book publishing industry by comparing markups and percentage markups of two
different versions of books, hard cover and paperbacks. The results suggested that
hardcover books had both higher margins and markups, and the price discrimination
could be explained by quality difference, not by cost difference. Cohen (2008) focuses
on the paper towel industry. Using a structural model of demand, the research
provided the evidence of second-degree price discrimination with respect to package
sizes in the paper towel industry. Average price discrimination, measured by markup
differences between 1-roll and multi-roll ranged from 34% to 46%.
There is also a body of empirical studies that examines the evidence of price
discrimination in the automobile industry. My work belongs to this literature. Studies
by Verboven (1996) and Verboven (2002) attempt to identify price discrimination in
the automobile industry. Verboven (1996) compares vehicle prices in Europe and
found that markups for the same vehicle were different substantially among different
countries. Verboven (2002) estimates markups for diesel and gasoline vehicles in
Europe to evaluate price discrimination. The paper suggested that diesel engines had
higher quality due to the lower cost of diesel fuel and were sold at higher markups.
Using a structural model of automobile demand in Norway, Thomassen (2010) reveals
there was second-degree price discrimination with engine variants. Markups were
increasing with horsepower, and consumers were paying higher price premium over
marginal cost. More recently, Langer (2012) analyzes that car dealers appeared
to price discriminate for new cars across demographic groups: Third-degree price
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discrimination. The study also found that price differences paid for new cars stemmed
from consumer knowledge or negotiation strength.
To my knowledge, this paper is the first study that investigates the presence of
the quality-based price discrimination against HEV consumers. The remainder of
this paper is structured as follows. Next section briefly describes the HEV market
and industry. Section 2.3 explains the empirical analysis, and data set are discussed
in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 presents the empirical results and Section 2.6 concludes
the study.
2.2 Hybrid Vehicle Market
Honda Insight and Toyota Prius were the first HEVs sold in U.S. The first generation
of Insight was available in the U.S. in December 1999, and a total of 13,889 units were
sold until Honda introduced the second generation of Insight in February 2009. In
June 2000, seven months after the Insight’s introduction in the U.S., Toyota officially
launched its first HEV model, the Prius, which was ranked as the top-selling HEV
model since its debut.
The most attractive aspect of the HEV to consumers is its fuel efficiency. A
HEV combines a gasoline engine with a battery-powered electric motor that provides
improved fuel economy and performance. While average city/highway combined fuel
economy of a new gasoline vehicle in 2001 was 22.1 MPG, the Insight and Prius
earned combined fuel economy of 64.2 MPG and 48.9 MPG respectively, which is
more than twice as much fuel economy compared to conventional gasoline vehicles.
As gasoline prices started to increase at the beginning of 2002, consumers actively
sought for more fuel efficient vehicles and started to show interest in HEVs.
The government also paid more attention to HEVs for environmental concern
and energy security issues. Improved fuel economy decreases emissions from vehicles
which in turn reduces total life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions, and also helps to
mitigate foreign oil dependency. In order to facilitate the purchase of HEVs, the
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federal government began to offer tax credits up to $3,400 for HEV models that were
purchased after December 31, 2005.
The amount of credits was planned to be phased out when cumulative sales of
a HEV model reached 60,000 units. HEV models sold after December 31, 2010 did
not qualify for the tax credit program. Table 2.1 presents the federal tax credits for
selective HEVs between the years 2006 and 2010.
With the continuous rise in gasoline prices and the government’s efforts to increase
HEV sales, HEVs can achieve growing market share. Table 2.2 shows the total LDV
and HEV sales from 2005 to 2013. A total of 472,597 of the 14,612,158 new LDVs
sold in 2013 were HEVs and the corresponding market share was 3.23%. The market
share of new hybrid cars and trucks in 2013 was 6.28% and 0.27% respectively.
As consumers have shown growing interests in HEVs, manufacturers such as GM,
Ford, Nissan and Chrysler also began offering HEV models. In 2000, the Insight and
Prius were the only available HEVs in the U.S., but by the end of 2013, there were
39 HEV models in the market. Toyota has a dominant position in the HEV market
producing 9 HEV models and alone accounting for 63.90% of the HEV market share
in 2013. Toyota is followed by Ford, GM and Honda with corresponding market
shares of 16.90%, 5.28% and 4.13% respectively. See Tables 2.3 and 2.4.
2.3 Empirical Model
This section presents a structure model of new vehicle demand and supply, and
explains how to identify price discrimination. Identifying price discrimination requires
estimating consumers’ demand for new vehicles and elasticities for each vehicle model.
After obtaining demand side parameters, I solve for a firm’s profit maximization
problem assuming that firms are engaged in Bertrand-Pricing behavior, and recover
marginal costs. Finally, price discrimination is measured by comparing markups
between HEVs and gasoline vehicles.
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Table 2.1: Federal Tax Credit for Qualified HEVs
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
BMW ActiveHybrid 7 $900
BMW X6 Hybrid $1550
Cadillac Escalade Hybrid $2,200 $2,200 $2,200
Chevrolet Malibu Hybrid $1,300 $1,550 $1,550 $1,550
Chevrolet Tahoe Hybrid $2,200 $2,200 $2,200 $2,200
Chevrolet Silverado Hybrid $650 $650 $2,200 $2,200
Chrysler Aspen Hybrid $2,200 $2,200
Dodge Durango Hybrid $2,200 $2,200
Ford Escape Hybrid $2,600 $3,000 $3,000 $1,688 $750
Ford Fusion Hybrid $1,913 $850
GMC Yukon $2,200 $2,200 $2,200 $2,200
GMC Sierra Hybrid $650 $650 $2,200
Honda Accord Hybrid $1,300 $1,300 $488
Honda Civic Hybrid $2,100 $2,100 $788
Honda Insight $1,450
Lexus GS 450h $1,356 $388
Lexus LS 600h $488
Lexus RX 400h/450h $1,925 $550
Mazda Tribute Hybrid $3,000 $3,000 $3,000
Mercedes Bentz S400
Hybrid
$1,150
Mercedes Bentz ML 450h $2,200
Mercury Mariner Hybrid $1,950 $3,000 $3,000 $1688 $750
Mercury Milan Hybrid $1,913 $850
Nissan Altima Hybrid $2,350 $2,350 $2,350 $2,350 $2,350
Porsche Cayenne Hybrid $1,800
Saturn Vue Hybrid $650 $1,550 $1,550
Saturn Aura Hybrid $1,300 $1,300 $1,550
Toyota Camry Hybrid $2,275 $650
Toyota Prius $2,756 $788
Toyota Highlander Hybrid $2,275 $650
Source: Internal Revenue Service
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Table 2.2: Total Light-duty Vehicle (LDV) and HEV Sales
Year LDV Sales Hybrid LDV Sales Hybrid LDV Shares # of LDV Models # of HEV Models
2005 16,179,364 205,459 1.27 240 7
2006 15,632,382 251,862 1.61 246 10
2007 15,609,701 352,401 2.26 260 13
2008 13,002,227 313,658 2.41 281 19
2009 10,283,123 290,604 2.83 294 23
2010 11,388,209 274,729 2.41 280 30
2011 12,656,723 268,785 2.12 279 32
2012 14,338,108 411,672 2.87 289 42
2013 14,612,158 472,597 3.23 270 39
Car Sales Hybrid Car Sales Hybrid Car Shares # of Car Models # of Hybrid Car Models
2005 7,098,981 151,253 2.13 126 4
2006 7,295,908 177,667 2.44 128 6
2007 7,595,921 283,547 3.73 138 8
2008 6,858,904 249,773 3.64 145 9
2009 5,536,770 237,086 4.28 156 12
2010 5,726,386 231,809 4.05 143 16
2011 6,108,983 237,833 3.89 147 19
2012 7,203,422 387,527 5.38 154 28
2013 7,203,195 452,483 6.28 152 28
Truck Sales Hybrid Truck Sales Hybrid Truck Shares # of Truck Models of Hybrid Truck Models
2005 9,080,383 54,206 0.60 114 3
2006 8,336,474 74,195 0.89 118 4
2007 8,013,780 68,854 0.86 122 5
2008 6,143,323 63,885 1.04 136 10
2009 4,746,353 53,518 1.13 138 11
2010 5,661,823 42,920 0.76 137 14
2011 6,547,740 30,952 0.47 132 13
2012 7,134,686 24,145 0.34 135 14
2013 7,408,963 20,114 0.27 118 11
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Table 2.3: Number of HEV Models, HEV Sales and HEV Market Shares by Manufacturers
Year TOYOTA HONDA FORD GM NISSAN CHRYSLER BMW DAIMLER PORSCHE MAZDA HYUNDAI VW AUDI KIA Total
2005 3 3 1 7
2006 5 3 2 10
2007 6 2 2 2 1 13
2008 6 2 2 6 1 2 19
2009 7 2 4 7 1 2 23
2010 7 3 5 8 1 2 2 1 1 30
2011 8 3 3 7 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 32
2012 10 4 4 8 2 4 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 42
2013 9 5 3 7 4 3 1 2 1 2 1 1 39
2005 146,512 43,356 15,591 205,459
2006 191,742 37,571 22,549 251,862
2007 277,750 35,980 25,108 5,175 8,388 352,401
2008 241,401 31,495 19,522 12,340 8,819 81 313,658
2009 195,545 36,023 33,502 16,135 9,357 42 290,064
2010 189,147 33,547 35,496 6,760 6,710 349 1,721 344 655 274,729
2011 178,588 31,582 27,114 5,025 3,614 382 310 1,623 484 19,673 390 268,785
2012 291,482 18,166 32,543 33,979 794 1,044 143 1,750 90 20,754 412 270 10,245 411,672
2013 301,812 19,528 79,949 24,945 1,792 1,456 282 728 21,559 5,773 854 13,919 472,597
2005 71.30% 21.10% 7.59% 100%
2006 76.10% 14.90% 8.95% 100%
2007 78.80% 10.20% 7.12% 1.47% 2.38% 100%
2008 77.00% 10.00% 6.22% 3.93% 2.81% 0.03% 100%
2009 67.30% 12.40% 11.50% 5.55% 3.22% 0.01% 100%
2010 68.80% 12.20% 12.90% 2.46% 2.44% 0.13% 0.63% 0.13% 0.24% 100%
2011 66.40% 11.70% 10.10% 1.87% 1.34% 0.14% 0.12% 0.60% 0.18% 7.32% 0.15% 100%
2012 70.80% 4.41% 7.91% 8.25% 0.19% 0.25% 0.03% 0.43% 0.02% 5.04% 0.10% 0.07% 2.49% 100%
2013 63.90% 4.13% 16.90% 5.28% 0.38% 0.31% 0.06% 0.15% 0.00% 4.56% 1.22% 0.18% 2.95% 100%
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Table 2.4: HEV Models Produced by Manufacturers in 2013: 39 Models
TOYOTA GM HONDA NISSAN
Avalon (0.21%) Escalade (0.08%) Accord (0.21%) M35 (0.10%)
CT 200h (3.19%) LaCrosse (1.51%) CR-Z (0.96%) Pathfinder (0.07%)
Camry (9.41%) Malibu (2.92%) Civic (1.63%) Q50 (0.07%)
ES 300h (3.50%) Regal (0.61%) ILX (0.31%) QX60 (0.14%)
GS 450h (0.11%) Silverado (0.02%) Insight (1.02%)
Highlander (1.07%) Tahoe (0.08%)
LS 600h (0.02%) Yukon (0.06%)
Prius (40.68%)
RX 450h (2.39%)
BMW FORD PORSCHE VOLKSWAGEN
ActiveHybrid 3 (0.19%) C-Max (7.45%) Cayenne S (9.41%) Jetta (1.20%)
ActiveHybrid 5 (0.11%) Fusion (7.89%) Panamera (0.02%) Touareg (0.03%)
ActiveHybrid 7 (0.01%) MKZ (1.58%)
AUDI DAIMLER HYUNDAI KIA
Q5 (0.18%) BENZ E400 (0.06%) Sonata (4.56%) Optima (2.95%)
Note: Market shares in parentheses
2.3.1 Demand Specification
I employ the random coefficients logit model for new vehicle demand estimation.
A utility maximizing consumer i’s indirect utility from purchasing a new vehicle
model j in period t is defined as follows:
uijt = αipjt +Xjtβi + ξjt + ijt,
j = 1, ..., J, t = 1, ..., T
(2.1)
where pjt is the price of vehicle model j, Xjt is a K-dimensional vector of observable
vehicle attributes, ξjt is the unobservable vehicle attributes such as style, quality,
brand reputation and loyalty. ijt is an idiosyncratic taste for product j and assumed
to be distributed i.i.d. with a Type I extreme value. Finally, αi and βi are individual
specific coefficients that can be decomposed into mean preference common to all
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consumers and a deviation from the mean. αi is consumer i’s preference for price and
consists of mean preference (α), observed income (yi) and unobserved preferences for
vehicle price (viα): αi = α+ σyyi + σαviα. A sample of household income is obtained
from the Current Population Survey conducted jointly by the Census Bureau and
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Mean and standard deviation of household income
are estimated under the assumption of a log-normal distribution, and 100 individuals
were randomly drawn in each year for the estimation. viα represents unobserved
consumer characteristics and assumed to follow a standard normal distribution. σy
and σα are parameters measuring preference variation with yi and viα.
Consumer i’s preference for vehicle attributes, βi is formed as βi = βk+σkvik where
βk is the mean preference and σkvik is each consumer’s deviation from the mean.
vik = (vi1, . . . , viK) is a vector of random variables that represents the idiosyncratic
preferences of consumer i for the K observed vehicle attributes, which are assumed
to follow a standard normal distribution. σk can be interpreted as the standard
deviation of preference for vehicle attribute k in the population that needs to be
estimated. vik is interacted with σk and forms consumer i’s personal preferences for
vehicle attribute k, σik = σkvik. This term helps to understand why some consumers
show strong preference for a certain attribute over others.
The indirect utility function can be decomposed as follows:
uijt =
(
αpjt +Xjtβk + ξjt
)
+ (σyyi + σαviα)pjt +
(
K∑
k
σkvikxjkt
)
+ ijt
= δjt(Xjt, pjt, ξjt; θ1) + µijt(Xjt, pjt, yi, vi; θ2) + ijt
= δjt + µijt + ijt
where δjt is the mean utility from the purchase of vehicle j that is the same for all
consumers and µijt + ijt represents the deviation from the mean utility that captures
random coefficients effect. Parameters to be estimated are mean tastes coefficients
common to all consumers, θ1 = {α, β} and deviation from the mean, θ2 = {σy, σα, σk}.
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The specification of the demand system is completed by introducing the indirect
utility for the outside good which measures the consumer’s utility that earns from
the purchase of goods other than a new car:
ui0t = ξ0t + σ0yi + σ0vi0 + i0t
Consumers are assumed to buy one unit of product that gives the highest utility
level. The probability that consumer i chooses product j in period t gives
Pijt = Prob(uijt > uilt, ∀l 6= j, l = 0, 1, . . . , J | yi, vi, ijt) (2.2)
As assumed, ijt follows i.i.d with Type I extreme value. If we normalize the mean
utility of outside good to be zero, then market share of product j for consumer i in
period t becomes
sijt =
exp(δjt + µijt)
1 +
∑J
l=1 exp(δlt + µilt)
(2.3)
Overall Market share can be calculated by integrating the individual market share:
sjt =
∫ ∫
sijtdFy(yi)dFv(vi)
=
∫ ∫ [
exp(δjt + µijt)
1 +
∑J
l=1 exp(δlt + µilt)
]
dFy(yi)dFv(vi)
(2.4)
where Fy(yi) and Fv(vi) are distributions of yi and vi = (viα, vi1, . . . , viK).
The own and cross price elasticities of the market share of product j with respect
to the price of product g are
ηjgt ≡ ∂sjt
∂pgt
· pgt
sjt
=
 −
pjt
sjt
∫ ∫
αisijt(1− sijt)dFy(yi)dFv(vi) if j = g
pgt
sjt
∫ ∫
αisijtsigtdFy(yi)dFv(vi) otherwise.
Since BLP allows for consumers’ heterogeneity in the preference for vehicle attributes,
it shows larger substitution effects compared to the simple multinomial logit model.
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2.3.2 Demand Estimation
This section discusses the demand side estimation procedure. Parameters that need to
be estimated are θ1 = {α, β} and θ2 = {σy, σα, σk}. Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM) is used for the estimation.
2.3.2.1 Moment Conditions
We need to solve “Moment conditions” that match the market share equation sj to
actual market share Sj:
Min
θ
‖ sj(x, p, δ(x, p, ξ; θ1); θ2)− Sj ‖ (2.5)
where sj() is the market share that is defined by Equation (2.5) and Sj is the actual
observed market shares from the data.
Let Z = [z1, . . . , zM ] be a set of instrument variables and ω is a function of model
parameter, an error term:
G(θ) ≡ E[Zm · ω(θ∗)] = 0, m = 1, . . . ,M (2.6)
where θ∗ refers the true value of the parameters and the error term is defined as the
unobservable vehicle attributes:
ξjt ≡ δjt(x, p, St; θ2)− (αpjt +Xjtβ) = ωjt
Computing unobservable vehicle attributes, ξjt, requires solving mean utility level
δ.t from the system of market equations:
s(x, p, δt; θ2) = St t = 1, ..., T (2.7)
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where s(·) are market shares given by Equation (2.5) and St is the actual observed
market share from the data. Recall market share Equation (2.5):
sjt =
∫ ∫
sijtdFy(yi)dFv(vi)
=
∫ ∫ [
exp(δjt + µijt)
1 +
∑J
l=1 exp(δlt + µilt)
]
dFy(yi)dFv(vi)
(2.5)
Once we draw random variables for yi and vi for i = 1, . . . , R from the distributions
Fy(yi) and Fv(vi) for sample size of R, we can approximate integral for market share
that results from aggregating across i by the use of Monte Carlo simulation:
sjt(pt, xt, δt, FR; θ2) = (
1
R
)
R∑
i=1
sijt
= (
1
R
)
R∑
i=1
exp[δjt + µ(xjt, pjt, yi, υi; θ2)]
1 +
∑J
m=1 exp[δmt + µ(xmt, pmt, yi, υi; θ2)]
(2.8)
From this, we can obtain predicted market shares for given individual parameters
(σy, σα, σk) and mean utilities, δ. For full random coefficients model, however, the
system of Equation (2.8) is non-linear and δt does not have an analytical solution.
Instead, it can be solved numerically using contraction mapping suggested by BLP
(1995). Contraction mapping finds values of δ by the following interactive process
keeping individual parameters (σy, σα, σk) fixed at starting points:
δh+1t = δ
h
t + ln(St)− ln(s(pt, xt, δt, FR; θ2)), t = 1, ...T and h = 0, ..., H (2.9)
where st are computed market shares that simulated from Equation (2.9). The
contraction mapping process stops once the observed market share is equal to the
computed market share. H is the smallest integer such that ‖δHt − δH−1t ‖ is smaller
than some tolerance level, and δHt is approximation to δt.
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After solving δt, the error term can be defined as
ξjt(θ2) ≡ δjt(x, p, St; θ2)− (αpjt +Xjtβ) (2.10)
2.3.2.2 The Objective Function
The population moment condition that enters GMM objective functions is
G(θ) ≡ E[Zm · ξ(θ2)] = 0, m = 1, . . . ,M
where Z is the set of instrument variables. Then, GMM estimate is
θˆ2 = argmin
θ2
ξ(θ2)
′ZΦ−1Z ′ξ(θ2)
where Φ−1 is the optimal weight matrix which can be defined as
Φ−1 = (E(Z ′ξ′ξZ))−1
Using GMM, mean taste coefficients α and β are estimated by regressing mean utility
on observable vehicle attributes with the use of IVs:
(α̂, β̂) = (X ′ZΦ−1Z ′ZX)−1X ′Z ′ZΦ−1Z ′δ
2.3.2.3 Instrument Variables
Valid instrument variables are required for consistent and efficient estimation of the
model. Price is most likely to be correlated with unobserved vehicle attributes in
the demand equation which causes an endogeneity problem (e.g. Unobserved higher
quality is positively correlated with price). If we fail to correct for the endogeneity of
prices, the price coefficient will be biased toward zero which makes consumers appear
to be less sensitive to the price than they really are. Valid IVs should satisfy the
following two conditions. First, they should be uncorrelated with the error term.
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Table 2.5: Vehicle Segmentation Criteria
Segment Typical Price Range Typical Length
Lower Small Car Under $16,500 Under 170 ins.
Upper Small Car $16,501 to $21,000 Under 185 ins.
Small Specialty Car Under $25,000 Under 185 ins.
Lower Middle Car $21,001 to $25,000 185 to 195 ins.
Upper Middle Car $25,001 to $32,000 185 to 195 ins.
Middle Specialty Car $25,000 to $32,000 Under 200 ins.
Large Car $23,000 to $32,000 Over 195 ins.
Lower Luxury Car $32,001 to $42,000
Middle Luxury Car $42,001 to $65,000
Upper Luxury Car Over $65,000
Luxury Specialty Car Over $32,000
Luxury Sports Car Over $32,000
Small Cross Utility Vehicle Under $25,000 Under 180 ins.
Small Luxury Cross Utility Vehicle Over $32,000 Under 180 ins.
Middle Cross Utility Vehicle $20,000 to $34,000 180 to 195 ins.
Middle Luxury Cross Utility Vehicle Over $34,000 180 to 195 ins.
Large Cross Utility Vehicle Under $40,000 Over 195 ins.
Large Luxury Cross Utility Vehicle Over $40,000 Over 195 ins.
Small Sport Utility Vehicle Under $25,000 Under 180 ins.
Middle Sport Utility Vehicle $25,001 to $34,000 180 to 200 ins.
Middle Luxury Sport Utility Vehicle Over $34,000 180 to 195 ins.
Large Sport Utility Vehicle Under $49,000 Over 200 ins.
Large Luxury Sport Utility Vehicle Over $49,000 Over 195 ins.
Small Van Under $34,000 Under 210 ins.
Large Van Over $26,000 Over 210 ins.
Small Pickups Under 210 ins.
Large Pickups Over 205 ins.
Source: WardsAuto Data Center.
Second, they should be highly correlated with the endogenous variable, the price.
Followed by Bresnahan (1987), BLP (1995) and Furlong (2012), I constructed the
following IV sets for the model. First, observed vehicle attributes, Xjt themselves
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are used for IVs. The second set of IVs are based on the price competition faced
by vehicle j in the market. The logic implies that products with closer substitutes
are more likely to have lower prices due to competitiveness. It includes the sum of
the each vehicle attribute of other vehicles produced by the same firm
∑j
l 6=j,l∈Fj xlk,
and the sum of the each vehicle attribute of other vehicles produced by other firms∑j
l 6=j,l/∈Fj xlk where Fj is the set of vehicle models produced by firm F . The third set
of IVs is the sum of each vehicle attribute of other vehicles produced by the same firm
and the same vehicle type (e.g. Car, Truck, SUV etc.)
∑j
l 6=j,l 6=Fj ,l∈Gt xlk, and other
firms and other vehicle types
∑j
l 6=j,l 6=Fj ,l /∈Gt xlk where Gt is the group of vehicle types.
The last IV set is the sum of vehicle attributes of other vehicles in the same vehicle
segment (e.g. Large, Large Van etc.)
∑j
l 6=j,l∈Gs xlk where Gs is the group of vehicle
segment class. Each vehicle segment class and its criteria are listed in Table 2.5.
Among them, I include 8 IVs into the estimation that are highly correlated with the
price.
2.3.3 Supply Side
Supply side model is required to recover marginal costs. I assume that automobile
manufacturers engage in Bertrand-Nash competition to maximize the profit. Suppose
there are F multiproduct firms in the market and each firm f sells subset, F(f) of the
J products in the market. The profit function of a multiproduct firm f is
Πf =
∑
j∈F(f)
(pj −mcj)Msj(p)− FCf (2.11)
where F(f) is the subset of products produced by firm f , mcj is the marginal cost of
producing product j, M is the market size, sj(p) is the market share of product j and
FCf is the fixed cost for firm f . Solving the firm f ’s profit maximization problem
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yields the following first order condition:
∂Πf
∂pj
= sj(p) +
∑
r∈Ff
(Pr −mcr)∂sr(p)
∂Pj
= 0 ∀j ∈ Jf
If we further define the matrix:
Ωjr(p) = −∂sj(p)
∂pr
j, r ∈ J
and the market structure matrix
Λjr =
1 if j and r are produced by the same firm0 otherwise
then, the first order condition can be be written as following matrix form:
s(p)− Ω(p) ∗ Λ(p−mc) = 0
Finally markup and marginal cost are computed using the following equations:
p−mc = (Ω(p) ∗ Λ)−1s(p)
mc = p− (Ω(p) ∗ Λ)−1s(p)
(2.12)
Equation (2.12) clearly shows that markups are affected by following three factors: 1)
price elasticities (ηjr) which determines partial derivative matrix (Ωjr(p) = −ηjr sjpr ),
2) market structure matrix (Λ), and 3) market share of the vehicle model (s(p)).
2.3.4 Identifying Price Discrimination
The previous section provides markups for each vehicle that are required for measuring
price discrimination. Comparing average markups and percentage markups for
all HEV models and all gasoline vehicle models is an effective measure of price
discrimination. If the average markup for HEVs exceeds gasoline vehicles, automobile
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manufacturers do engage in price discrimination against HEV consumers. Average
markup and percentage markup are calculated by
1
H
1
T
H∑
h=1
T∑
t=1
(pht −mcht) 1
G
1
T
G∑
g=1
T∑
t=1
(pgt −mcgt)
1
H
1
T
H∑
h=1
T∑
t=1
(
pht −mcht
pht
)
1
G
1
T
G∑
g=1
T∑
t=1
(
pgt −mcgt
pgt
) (2.13)
where H and G are numbers of hybrid and gasoline vehicles in period t, and (pht −
mcht) and (pgt − mcgt) are markups for all hybrid and gasoline vehicle models in
period t respectively. Percentage markup is calculated markup divide by the price.
Note that Equation (2.13) calculates average markups and percentage markups
based on all HEV models and gasoline vehicle models in the market. Another way of
measuring discrimination is comparing average markups between HEV models with
their straight gasoline counterparts (e.g., Toyota Camry and Camry Hybrid). These
vehicles are almost identical except that HEVs have electric powertrain that enables
hybrid models to have better fuel economy than non-hybrid models:
1
T
T∑
t=1
(pjht −mcjht) 1
T
T∑
t=1
(pjgt −mcjgt) (2.14)
where jh and jg indicate the hybrid and non-hybrid vehicle model j. (pjht −mcjht)
is the markup of HEV model j and (pjgt − mcjgt) is the markup of the non-hybrid
counterpart gasoline vehicle model j in time t.
2.4 Data
This section explains data sets used in demand estimation. Four main data sets are
used in this study: 1) new vehicle sales, vehicle attributes and incentives, 2) monthly
regular retail gasoline prices, 3) federal tax credit for HEVs, and 4) total household
income.
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The primary data set in this study is monthly new car and light truck sales in
the U.S. market. New vehicle sales data are collected from the Automotive News
Data Center and the WardsAuto Data Center between January 2000 to December
2013. Monthly HEV sales data are separately collected from the Hybrid Market
Dashboard provided by Hybridcars.com. All vehicle sales data are collected monthly
then aggregated to yearly. In each year, more than 200 vehicle models are in the
market which comprise 3,565 observations in the sample period.
Vehicle prices and attributes data are obtained from WardsAuto Data Center.
New car incentives and cash rebates offered by manufacturers are separately collected
from Automotive News Data Center. Actual vehicle transaction prices are the most
suitable for this study but such data is difficult to obtain. While some studies
use actual transaction level purchase data from the individual survey (BLP 2004;
Langer 2012) or local car dealers (Copeland et al. 2011; Gujarado et al. 2014;
Murry 2014), most of the earlier studies on the automobile industry use listed
Manufacturer Suggested Retail Price (MSRP) because of the data unavailability (BLP
1995; Verboven 1996: Sudhir 2001; Petrin 2002; Thomassen 2010). I augment MSRP
with monthly cash rebates and HEV tax credits to make vehicle price data as close
to transaction level as possible.
The following vehicle attribute variables are included for demand specification:
dollars per mile (DPM), the ratio of horsepower to curb weight (HPW), Size, Hybrid
dummy, vehicle type dummies (Truck, SUV, Specialty, Luxury)2 and 23 manufacturer
(e.g., Toyota, BMW, GM, etc.) dummies. DPM measures the fuel cost per mile and
is calculated gasoline prices divided by miles per gallon (MPG). Size is a proxy for
both comfort and safety and calculated as length multiplied by width and height. A
set of dummy variables account for unobservable vehicle attributes and fixed effects.
Yearly average gasoline prices are required to calculate fuel cost per mile (DPM).
I collected this data from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) between the
years 2000 to 2013.
2See Table 2.5 for details on vehicle type segmentation criteria.
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As discussed in section 2.2, the federal government provides tax credits for eligible
HEV models. Therefore, additional federal tax credits are subtracted from the MSRP.
HEV tax credit information is available at the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
Individual preference for the price, αi, is interacted with a demographic variable,
total household income, and forms a random coefficient. Total household income
data are collected from the Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic
Supplements (CPS ASEC) provided by U.S. Census Bureau and Bureau of Labor
Statistics. Each year, 100 individuals were randomly drawn and used for the demand
estimation.
Not only vehicle attribute variables but macroeconomic indicators also have
significant effects on consumers’ vehicle choice. To address this issue, I include
unemployment rate (Unemp) obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and a
quadratic time trend (Trend and Trend2) during sample period.
Total market size, Mt, is required to calculate market share of each vehicle model,
sjt, and outside market share, s0. I define total market size as the total number
of households in the U.S. Then, market share of each vehicle model j in year t is
calculated by sjt =
qjt
Mt
where qjt is the total yearly sales of each vehicle model, and
outside market share is defined by the subtracting sum of all vehicle market shares
from 1:
s0t = 1−
J∑
j=1
sjt
Finally, vehicle prices, gasoline prices and household income are shown in 2012
dollars using consumer price index (CPI) which is available at U.S. Department of
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
2.5 Results
This section presents the results of empirical analysis as follows: descriptive statistics
of variables used in the demand estimation, followed by the parameter estimates and
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elasticities, and concluded with a comparison of markups and percentage markups
between HEVs and gasoline vehicles to measure price discrimination.
2.5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Tables 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 respectively report descriptive statistics of vehicle attributes
for all LDVs, gasoline LDVs and hybrid LDVs that are used in the estimation. These
variables include vehicle Price, HPW, DPM and Size.3 The sales weighted average
price of gasoline LDV is $27,137 with a standard deviation of $10,533 (Table 2.7).
The sales weighted average price of HEVs after adjusting for cash rebates and HEV
tax credits is slightly more expensive due to the hybrid premium, $27,992. However,
MPG and DPM variables in Table 2.8 clearly show better fuel efficiency of HEVs.
Table 2.6: Descriptive Statistics of Vehicle Attributes: All LDVs (2000 - 2013)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean1 Std. Dev.1 Min Max
Price ($1,000s) 37.155 23.711 27.149 10.502 11.277 540.460
HPW 0.059 0.016 0.054 0.010 0.024 0.174
MPG 22.946 5.671 23.599 5.441 12.400 64.200
DPM 0.129 0.041 0.120 0.038 0.028 0.285
Size 0.872 0.197 0.902 0.199 0.395 1.486
Length (ins.) 187.93 15.20 190.37 13.81 106.1 230.0
Width (ins.) 73.122 4.034 73.227 4.201 61.4 89.0
Height (ins.) 62.701 7.904 63.912 7.453 44.0 83.7
# of Observations 3,565
Notes:
1. Sales Weighted
2. Price = MSRP-Cash Rebate-HEV Tax Credit (In case of a HEV)
3. DPM = Gas Price($) / MPG
4. HPW = HP / Curb Weight(lbs.)
5. Size = (Length×Width×Height) / 1,000,000
3MPG, Length, Width and Height variables are included in the descriptive statistic table, but
not used in the estimation.
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Table 2.7: Descriptive Statistics of Vehicle Attributes: All Gasoline LDVs (2000 -
2013)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean1 Std. Dev.1 Min Max
Price ($1,000s) 36.731 23.706 27.137 10.533 11.277 540.460
HPW 0.059 0.016 0.054 0.010 0.033 0.174
MPG 22.278 4.440 23.307 4.796 12.400 38.700
DPM 0.130 0.040 0.121 0.038 0.046 0.285
Size 0.872 0.198 0.904 0.200 0.395 1.486
Length (ins.) 187.92 15.28 190.52 13.81 106.1 228.9
Width (ins.) 73.153 4.066 73.276 4.203 61.40 89.0
Height (ins.) 62.727 7.963 63.975 7.475 44.0 83.7
# of Observations 3,340
Notes:
1. Sales Weighted
2. Price = MSRP-Cash Rebate-HEV Tax Credit (In case of a HEV)
3. DPM = Gas Price($) / MPG
4. HPW = HP / Curb Weight(lbs.)
5. Size = (Length×Width×Height) / 1,000,000
Table 2.8: Descriptive Statistics of Vehicle Attributes: All Hybrid LDVs (2000 -
2013)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean1 Std. Dev.1 Min Max
Price ($1,000s) 43.434 22.929 27.992 8.071 19.290 120.805
HPW 0.050 0.014 0.037 0.009 0.024 0.090
MPG 32.863 10.605 43.469 8.864 17.900 64.200
DPM 0.109 0.037 0.077 0.022 0.028 0.205
Size 0.861 0.183 0.752 0.091 0.551 1.358
Length (ins.) 188.08 14.02 179.84 7.860 155.1 230.0
Width (ins.) 72.663 3.510 69.908 2.262 66.70 80.0
Height (ins.) 62.316 6.974 59.610 3.881 53.3 76.9
# of Observations 225
Notes:
1. Sales Weighted
2. Price = MSRP-Cash Rebate-HEV Tax Credit (In case of a HEV)
3. DPM = Gas Price($) / MPG
4. HPW = HP / Curb Weight(lbs.)
5. Size = (Length×Width×Height) / 1,000,000
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While sales weighted average MPG and DPM of gasoline vehicles are 23.31 and
$0.12, HEVs have much higher fuel economy of 43.47 and lower DPM of $0.08
respectively. Though HEVs are more fuel efficient, they are smaller in size and less
powerful than gasoline LDVs. HEVs have an average size of 0.752 and gasoline
vehicles have a slightly larger size at 0.904. HEVs are less powerful than gasoline
vehicles in terms of HPW. This can be attributed to the fact that most HEV models
belong to the midsize class, and HEV models are base or lower trim level of their
counterpart gasoline vehicle models. Summary statistics of total household income
for sample years are shown in Table 2.9.
Table 2.9: Descriptive Statistics of Total Household Income
Year Median Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
2000 $64,601 $81,904 $71,008 $1.38 $1,059,337
2001 $65,676 $83,641 $79,332 $1.27 $993,956
2002 $68,031 $87,354 $82,926 $1.30 $1,101,176
2003 $66,904 $85,658 $82,898 $1.28 $1,260,408
2004 $67,415 $86,208 $82,503 $1.25 $1,344,271
2005 $67,012 $85,939 $82,981 $1.22 $1,368,000
2006 $67,569 $87,214 $85,396 $1.18 $1,315,798
2007 $68,328 $89,065 $88,948 $1.14 $1,369,756
2008 $68,769 $87,908 $82,355 $1.11 $1,166,724
2009 $67,183 $86,013 $80,496 $1.07 $1,077,188
2010 $65,299 $85,182 $81,924 $1.07 $1,260,789
2011 $64,283 $83,549 $83,718 $1.05 $2,064,059
2012 $63,842 $83,960 $89,334 $1.02 $2,143,868
2013 $64,200 $84,390 $91,583 $1.00 $2,742,997
Note: Data are obtained from CPS Annual Social and Economic Supplement
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2.5.2 Parameter Estimates
Demand estimation results from the OLS logit and IV logit regression are presented
in Table 2.10. Several interesting points are worth discussing. The first column of the
table displays the OLS results without 23 manufacturer dummies and the second and
third columns respectively show estimation results including manufacturer dummies.
Most of the coefficient estimates have expected signs and are statistically significant.
The price coefficient has a negative sign and is significant for all three specifications.
Comparing the magnitude of estimated price coefficients between OLS logit with
manufacturer dummies (-0.0273) and IV logit (-0.0993), models clearly shows the
importance of introducing IVs when the endogeneity of price exists. Consumers are
more price sensitive once the endogenous problem is corrected for. As a result, price
sensitivity of consumers increases almost four times in IV logit regression. Vehicle
attribute coefficients reveal the consumer’s preference on vehicle choices. It turns out
that, on average, consumers like powerful, fuel efficient and comfortable cars. The
coefficient estimates on HPW, DPM and Size have expected signs and significantly
different from zero in both the OLS and IV logit models. The negative and significant
coefficient of hybrid dummy variable suggests that average consumers dislike HEVs
compared to gasoline vehicles. It seems that average consumers are suspicious about
novel fuel efficient HEV technology, which can partly explain why the hybrid car
market share still remains at 6%. I also interact hybrid dummy variable with a
quadratic time trend (Hytrend and Hytrend2) to track down the adoption of HEVs
during the sample time period.Hybrid time trend variable is estimated to be positive
in all demand specifications, which implies consumers’ preference on HEVs has been
growing over time. According to the coefficient estimates on vehicle type dummy
variables, consumers prefer SUVs but do not like pickup trucks, specialties (coupe
and convertible) and luxury vehicles. As expected, unemployment rate is negatively
associated with vehicle market shares.
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Table 2.10: OLS and IV Logit Model Estimation Results
Dependent variable: ln(sj)− ln(s0)
(1) (2) (3)
Variable OLS Logit OLS Logit IV Logit
Price -0.0259∗∗∗ (0.002) -0.0273∗∗∗ (0.002) -0.0993∗∗∗ (0.011)
HPW 7.135∗∗∗ (1.883) 2.422 (1.836) 40.34∗∗∗ (6.224)
DPM -12.64∗∗∗ (1.073) -10.56∗∗∗ (0.944) -7.126∗∗∗ (1.304)
Size 1.754∗∗∗ (0.154) 0.815∗∗∗ (0.156) 2.790∗∗∗ (0.359)
Hybrid -2.631∗∗∗ (0.590) -3.454∗∗∗ (0.510) -2.161∗∗∗ (0.553)
Hytrend 0.344∗∗ (0.136) 0.393∗∗∗ (0.117) 0.331∗∗∗ (0.120)
Hytrend2 -0.0192∗∗ (0.0075) -0.0203∗∗∗ (0.0065) -0.0168∗∗ (0.007)
Truck 0.371∗∗∗ (0.0799) 0.199∗∗∗ (0.0707) -0.183∗ (0.104)
SUV 0.167∗∗∗ (0.0595) 0.213∗∗∗ (0.0587) 0.598∗∗∗ (0.0956)
Specialty -0.552∗∗∗ (0.0625) -0.714∗∗∗ (0.0573) -0.463∗∗∗ (0.0784)
Luxury -0.236∗∗∗ (0.0434) -0.169∗∗∗ (0.0459) -0.560∗∗∗ (0.0809)
Trend 0.0416∗ (0.0248) 0.04∗ (0.0217) -0.108∗∗∗ (0.0350)
Trend2 0.0019 (0.0013) 0.00112 (0.0012) 0.0052∗∗∗ (0.0015)
Unemp -0.181∗∗∗ (0.0163) -0.172∗∗∗ (0.0141) -0.133∗∗∗ (0.0174)
Constant -6.682∗∗∗ (0.157) -5.796∗∗∗ (0.182) -6.590∗∗∗ (0.247)
R-Squared 0.352 0.530 0.334
Manufacturer
Dummies
NO YES YES
Notes:
1. Standard errors in parentheses
2. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
3. Parameter estimates of manufacturer dummy variables are excluded from the table.
Table 2.11 compares demand estimate results from the IV logit model and Random
coefficients logit model.4 Column (1) is simply copied from column (3) in Table 2.10
for comparison purpose. The first panel of column (2) reports estimates of mean
4Knittel and Metaxoglou (2013) point out that BLP demand estimation results are sensitive to
the choice of starting values and optimization algorithm. To overcome this issue, I use multiple sets
of starting values, and employ derivative-based algorithm (SOLVOPT) that lead to the minimum
GMM objective function value.
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taste coefficients and the second panel provides estimates of heterogeneity taste
parameters for three vehicle attributes (HPW, DPM, Size) as well as Price, all of
Table 2.11: Random Coefficients Logit Model Estimation Results
Dependent variable: ln(sj)− ln(s0)
Variable (1) IV Logit (2) Random Coefficients Logit
Price -0.0993∗∗∗ (0.0113) -0.289∗ (0.169)
HPW 40.34∗∗∗ (6.224) 14.322 (33.335)
DPM -7.126∗∗∗ (1.304) -58.153∗ (32.211)
Size 2.790∗∗∗ (0.359) 0.822∗∗ (2.298)
Hybrid -2.161∗∗∗ (0.553) -5.440∗∗ (2.538)
Hytrend 0.331∗∗∗ (0.120) 0.612∗ (0.361)
Hytrend2 -0.0168∗∗ (0.0067) -0.027∗ (0.017)
Pickup -0.183∗ (0.104) -0.424 (0.663)
SUV 0.598∗∗∗ (0.0956) 0.611∗∗ (0.311)
Specialty -0.463∗∗∗ (0.0784) -0.782∗∗∗ (0.231)
Luxury -0.560∗∗∗ (0.0809) -0.845∗ (0.487)
Trend -0.108∗∗∗ (0.0350) -0.160 (0.366)
Trend2 0.0052∗∗∗ (0.0015) 0.017 (0.016)
Unemp -0.133∗∗∗ (0.0174) -0.403∗ (0.232)
Constant -6.590∗∗∗ (0.247) -1.622 (-2.565)
Heterogeneity Parameters (σ)
Constant 1.469 (2.64)
Price 0.121∗∗ (0.054)
HPW 10.081 (21.64)
DPM 35.013 (24.189)
Size 4.21∗∗∗ (1.394)
Income 0.085∗ (0.046)
Manufacturer
Dummies
YES YES
J statistic (D.F.) 1.08 (2)
Notes:
1. Standard errors in parentheses
2. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
3. Parameter estimates of manufacturer dummy variables are excluded from the table.
which are normally distributed. Price coefficient, marginal utility of income, varies
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with household income.5 Estimated mean taste coefficients in random coefficients
models have same signs with IV logit model estimates. Consumers have significant
heterogeneous tastes on price and size. Income heterogeneity coefficient is positive
and significant indicating that higher income consumers are less sensitive to price
than average consumers. In addition to demand side parameters, I also estimate cost
side parameters and report the results in Table 2.12. These parameters are obtained
by regressing estimated marginal cost (MC) on the cost side variables, Size, HPW,
Hybrid as well as time trend dummy variable (Equation (2.15)):
ln(MCjt) = δ0 + δ1ln(Sizejt) + δ2ln(HPWjt) + δ3Hybridjt + δ4Trendt + ωjt (2.15)
In order to capture the effect of returns to scale, a separate regression model including
logarithm of cumulative vehicle sales (ln(Sales)) is estimated and the results are
reported in the second column of Table 2.12. Coefficients on Size and HPW are
Table 2.12: Cost Side Parameters Estimation Results
Dependent variable: ln(MC)
Variable Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
ln(Size) 0.713∗∗∗ (0.043) 0.746∗∗∗ (0.043)
ln(HPW) 0.461∗∗∗ (0.022) 0.466∗∗∗ (0.022)
Hybrid 0.306∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.307∗∗∗ (0.019)
Trend -0.015∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.002∗∗∗ (0.002)
ln(Sales) -0.078∗∗∗ (0.012)
Constant 4.838∗∗∗ (0.075) 6.200∗∗∗ (0.215)
R-Squared 0.883 0.885
Notes:
1. OLS regression of log of estimated marginal cost on cost side variables
2. Standard errors in parentheses
3. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
4. Parameter estimates of manufacturer and vehicle segment dummy variables are
excluded from the table.
5I use demeaned value of household income for calculation purpose.
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positive and significant which make sense because it costs more to produce bigger,
more comfortable and more powerful vehicles. HEVs, on average, are estimated to
cost 30.6% more than conventional gasoline vehicles.
2.5.3 Elasticities
In this section, I discuss estimated own and cross price elasticties for selective vehicle
models. Since the random coefficients logit model has systematic heterogeneity among
consumers, it provides a much larger flexible substitution patterns than a simple logit
model. Table 2.13 displays the estimated own and cross price elasticities for selective
vehicle models in 2013. Both own and cross elasticities explain percentage changes
of market share with respect to the 1% increase in the vehicle price. For example,
1% increase in the price of the BMW 750i leads to the market share of the BMW X3
and the Ford Mustang to increase by 0.08% and 0.002% respectively. The more close
substitutes, the higher cross price elasticity in magnitude we would expect. Honda
civic has higher cross price elasticity than BENZ SL550 since it has more substitutes.
Not surprisingly, vehicles within the same segment that have similar price range and
attributes have larger cross price elasticities. BMW 750i is the closest substitute
to the Benz SL 550 in that the SL 550 has the largest cross price elasticities of
0.011. Similarly, the Toyota Prius is the closest substitute for the Honda Civic Hybrid
(0.042).
2.5.4 Marginal Costs, Markups and Price Discrimination
This section presents estimated marginal costs, markups and percentage markups
derived from the demand side parameters in Table 2.11. I then compare markups
and percentage markups between gasoline vehicles and HEVs to investigate the
evidence of price discrimination against HEV consumers. Descriptive statistics of
marginal costs,markups and percentage markups are summarized in Table 2.14 and
are compared across vehicle types in the sample period. The first panel compares the
51
Table 2.13: A sample of Estimated Mean Own and Cross Price Elasticities (2013)
Vehicle Model
Own
Elasticity
750i X3 Malibu Mustang Escape Civic
Civic
Hybrid
BMW 7 Series 750i -5.257 -5.257 0.010 0.011 0.004 0.020 0.013 0.001
BMW X3 -4.502 0.008 -4.502 0.025 0.011 0.043 0.031 0.001
CHEVROLET Malibu -4.351 0.002 0.007 -4.351 0.016 0.062 0.055 0.001
FORD Mustang -4.872 0.002 0.007 0.039 -4.872 0.069 0.058 0.001
FORD Escape -4.604 0.003 0.007 0.038 0.017 -4.604 0.054 0.001
HONDA Civic -3.904 0.002 0.006 0.038 0.017 0.061 -3.904 0.001
HONDA Civic Hybrid -3.232 0.004 0.006 0.029 0.008 0.038 0.036 -3.232
HONDA CR-Z -3.622 0.003 0.006 0.032 0.013 0.051 0.046 0.001
HYUNDAI Sonata -4.384 0.002 0.007 0.040 0.017 0.064 0.057 0.001
BENZ SL550 -5.514 0.011 0.008 0.008 0.003 0.015 0.010 0.001
NISSAN Maxima -5.080 0.005 0.010 0.032 0.018 0.059 0.043 0.001
TOYOTA Prius -3.098 0.003 0.006 0.030 0.007 0.037 0.037 0.002
VOLKSWAGEN Jetta -3.976 0.002 0.005 0.037 0.018 0.066 0.060 0.001
VOLKSWAGEN Tiguan -4.916 0.002 0.007 0.035 0.021 0.070 0.054 0.001
Vehicle Model
Own
Elasticity
CR-Z Sonata SL 550 Maxima Prius Jetta Tiguan
BMW 7 series 750 i -5.257 0.000 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.015 0.005 0.002
BMW X3 28i -4.502 0.000 0.023 0.005 0.014 0.022 0.012 0.004
CHEVROLET Malibu -4.351 0.001 0.038 0.001 0.013 0.032 0.024 0.006
FORD Mustang -4.872 0.001 0.039 0.001 0.017 0.019 0.028 0.008
FORD Escape -4.604 0.001 0.037 0.002 0.014 0.024 0.026 0.007
HONDA Civic -3.904 0.001 0.036 0.001 0.012 0.027 0.026 0.006
HONDA Civic Hybrid -3.232 0.001 0.025 0.003 0.007 0.042 0.013 0.002
HONDA CR-Z -3.622 -3.622 0.030 0.002 0.011 0.027 0.021 0.005
HYUNDAI Sonata -4.384 0.001 -4.384 0.001 0.013 0.029 0.026 0.006
BENZ SL550 -5.514 0.000 0.007 -5.514 0.006 0.014 0.003 0.001
NISSAN Maxima -5.080 0.001 0.031 0.003 -5.080 0.017 0.020 0.007
TOYOTA Prius -3.098 0.001 0.025 0.002 0.006 -3.098 0.012 0.002
VOLKSWAGEN Jetta -3.976 0.001 0.037 0.001 0.012 0.021 -3.976 0.007
VOLKSWAGEN Tiguan -4.916 0.001 0.036 0.001 0.017 0.014 0.029 -4.916
Note: The table shows the elasticity of demand of the row entry, i, with respect to the price of the column entry j,
which can be interpreted as the percentage change in market share of vehicle model i with respect to one percent change
in price of vehicle model j.
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Table 2.14: Sales Weighted Average Price, Implied Marginal Cost, Markup and Markup(%) Estimates across Vehicle Types
(2000 - 2013)
All Cars All Light Trucks
Price MC Markup Markup(%) Price MC Markup Markup(%)
Mean $25,597 $21,068 $4,529 19.42% Mean $28,449 $23,777 $4,672 17.30%
95%
CI
[$25,030 $26,164] [$20,527 $21,609] [$4,481 $4,578] [19.17% 19.66%]
95%
CI
[$27,997 $28,902] [$23,344 $24,211] [$4,628 $4,716] [17.10% 17.50%]
Min $11,277 $7,211 $2,856 3.50% Min $16,000 $11,911 $2,946 4.30%
Max $118,814 $114,635 $13,831 36.90% Max $113,974 $107,591 $13,230 29.30%
Regular LDVs Luxury LDVs
Price MC Markup Markup(%) Price MC Markup Markup(%)
Mean $23,198 $18,797 $4,401 19.59% Mean $43,386 $37,930 $5,456 13.05%
95%
CI
[$22,985 $23,411] [$18,592 $19,003] [$4,374 $4,427] [19.40% 19.77%]
95%
CI
[$42,727 $44,045] [$37,289 $38,570] [$5,374 $5,538] [12.86% 13.24%]
Min $11,277 $7,211 $2,856 11.40% Min $28,922 $23,697 $3,426 3.50%
Max $35,386 $31,081 $8,001 36.90% Max $118,814 $114,635 $13,381 27.50%
Gasoline LDVs Hybrid LDVs
Price MC Markup Markup(%) Price MC Markup Markup(%)
Mean $27,050 $22,455 $4,595 18.33% Mean $27,074 $22,003 $5,071 19.19%
95%
CI
[$26,674 $27,426] [$22,095 $22,815] [$4,562 $4,628] [18.16% 18.49%]
95%
CI
[$25,965 $28,184] [$20,949 $23,058] [$4,888 $5,253] [18.46% 19.93%]
Min $11,277 $7,211 $2,856 3.50% Min $19,290 $14,644 $3,689 10.70%
Max $118,814 $114,635 $13,831 36.90% Max $52,933 $47,246 $11,234 27.60%
Gasoline Cars Hybrid Cars
Price MC Markup Markup(%) Price MC Markup Markup(%)
Mean $25,600 $21,082 $4,518 19.41% Mean $25,480 $20,528 $4,952 19.69%
95%
CI
[$25,012 $26,189] [$20,520 $21,644] [$4,468 $4,568] [19.16% 19.67%]
95%
CI
[$24,743 $26,216] [$19,782 $21,273] [$4,786 $5,119] [18.88% 20.50%]
Min $11,277 $7,211 $2,856 3.50% Min $19,290 $14,644 $3,689 12.30%
Max $118,814 $114,635 $13,831 36.90% Max $40,145 $34,940 $6,909 27.60%
Gasoline Light Trucks Hybrid Light Trucks
Price MC Markup Markup(%) Price MC Markup Markup(%)
Mean $28,415 $23,748 $4,668 17.31% Mean $38,006 $32,120 $5,885 15.76%
95%
CI
[$27,959 $28,871] [$23,310 $24,185] [$4,624 $4,711] [17.10% 17.51%]
95%
CI
[$35,092 $40,920] [$29,423 $34,818] [$5,259 $6,512] [14.32% 17.20%]
Min $16,000 $11,911 $2,946 4.30% Min $25,913 $20,101 $3,921 10.07%
Max $113,974 $107,591 $13,230 29.30% Max $52,933 $47,246 $11,234 24.5%
Note: Marginal cost, markups and markups(%) are derived from the demand side parameters.
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statistics between all cars and light trucks, and the second panel compares the
statistics between regular LDVs and luxury LDVs.6 On average, light trucks and
luxury LDVs have higher markups but have lower percentage markups than cars
and regular LDVs. Since light trucks and luxury LDVs are more expensive than
cars and regular LDVs, markups are greater for light trucks and luxury LDVs but
manufacturers cannot charge markups proportionally as they do for cars and regular
LDVs. Panels 3-5 in Table 2.14 show markup and percentage markup comparisons
between HEVs and gasoline vehicles. It turns out that hybrid LDVs have both higher
markups and percentage markups than gasoline LDVs. The average markups for
gasoline gasoline and hybrid LDVs are $4,595 and $5,071, corresponding to 18.33%
and 19.19% of percentage markups. Though hybrid vehicles are more expensive than
gasoline vehicles due to hybrid premium, manufacturers charge both higher markups
and percentage markups for their hybrid vehicles. I then separate total LDVs by cars
and light trucks, and compare markup and percentage markup differences. Hybrid
cars have both higher markups and percentage markups than gasoline cars. Average
gasoline car markup and hybrid car markup respectively averaged $4,518 and $4,952
and corresponding average percentage markups are 19.41% and 19.69%. In light
trucks, hybrid light trucks have far greater markups ($5,885) than gasoline light
trucks ($4,668) but have smaller percentage markups of 15.76% than gasoline trucks,
%17.31. This can be partly explained by huge price differences between hybrid and
non-hybrid light trucks.
In addition, I carry out an auxiliary regression of estimated markups and
percentage markups on Hybrid and Hybrid-Trend interaction dummy variables
(Hytrend). Results are shown in Tables 2.15 and 2.16. It is estimated that HEVs
have 11.09% higher markups than gasoline vehicles, on average. The coefficient of
Hytrend variable implies that HEV markups decrease during the time period with an
approximate 3.5% per year due to increased competition in HEV market. I find the
6T-test results reject the null hypothesis of no statistically significant difference in average
markups between gasoline LDVs and Hybrid LDVs. However, I do not find an evidence of significant
difference in average percentage markups between two vehicle types.
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similar result for percentage markups. On average, there is no significant percentage
markup differences between HEVs and gasoline vehicles. However, Hytrend coefficient
in Table 2.16 implies that percentage markups of HEVs are also greater than gasoline
vehicles and decrease at the rate of 3.7%.
Table 2.15: Regression Result of Estimated Markup on HEVs
Dependent variable: ln(Markup)
Variable Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Hybrid 0.1109∗∗∗ (0.029) 0.4739∗∗∗ (0.090)
Hytrend -0.0354∗∗∗ (0.008)
Constant 1.6804∗∗∗ (0.058) 1.6778∗∗∗ (0.058)
R-Squared 0.278 0.282
Notes:
1. Standard errors in parentheses
2. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
3. Parameter estimates of manufacturer and vehicle segment dummy variables are
excluded from the table.
Table 2.16: Regression Result of Estimated Markup(%) on HEVs
Dependent variable: ln(Markup(%))
Variable Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Hybrid -0.0079 (0.029) 0.3761∗∗∗ (0.093)
Hytrend -0.0374∗∗∗ (0.009)
Constant -1.9214∗∗∗ (0.060) -1.9243∗∗∗ (0.060)
R-Squared 0.435 0.438
Notes:
1. Standard errors in parentheses
2. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
3. Parameter estimates of manufacturer and vehicle segment dummy variables are
excluded from the table.
We discuss in section 2.3.3 that markups are primarily determined by price
elasticities and market structure, i.e., number of vehicle models produced by the
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manufacturer, which in turn determines market share. Higher market share enables
a firm to have a stronger market position that allows a firm to have an ability to
charge higher markups leveraging their dominant position in the market. I report
this relationship in Table 2.17. Table 2.17 presents average market share, price,
marginal cost, markups and percentage markups of all LDVs by manufacturers.
During the time period, General Motors (GM) gains the most market share of 21.06%
and has the highest estimated markup ($5,024), and the big three manufacturers
(GM, Toyota, Ford) have similar percentage markups of (19%). Table 2.18 replicates
Table 2.17 but I include only HEVs. The table confirms the fact that Toyota is the top
HEV manufacturer in that Toyota alone accounts for approximately 70.0% of total
HEV market share over the sample period. As we would expect from the observed
market share, Toyota charges the highest average markup of $4,412 for their HEV
models among other HEV manufacturers in 2013. Toyota, Ford and Volkswagen
have similar HEV average prices but Toyota has the both highest markups and
percentage markups than other manufacturers.7 I also find in Table 2.18 that markups
and percentage markups of HEVs kept decreasing over the sample period. Two
competition effects can explain this phenomenon. First, competition between gasoline
vehicles and HEVs. As gasoline vehicles become more fuel efficient, manufacturers
hesitate to charge higher markups for their HEVs to compete with gasoline vehicles.
In addition, competition between HEVs has been increased as more HEV models are
introduced in the market. In order to compute the extent of price discrimination, I
then directly compare average markup and percentage markup differences between
HEV models with comparable non-hybrid counterpart gasoline models manufactured
7I test if average markups and percentage markups for HEVs are statistically different across
manufacturers. The results show that there is no statistically significant difference in average
markups for HEVs across major automobile manufacturers, Toyota, Honda, Ford, GM and Nissan.
However, I find a statistically significant difference in average markups of these manufacturers with
those of new HEV market entrants, Hyundai, KIA and Volkswagen. Hyundai, KIA and Volkswagen
have smaller average markups for their HEVs than other major manufactures. I also find average
percentage markups of Toyota’s HEVs are statistically different from each manufacturer except for
Nissan.
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by Toyota. Table 2.19 displays average marginal cost, markup and percentage markup
for Toyota’s HEV models, and Table 2.20 reports the comparison results. Among 9
Table 2.17: Average Market Share, Price, Marginal Cost, Markup and Markup(%)
Estimates by Manufacturers: All LDVs (2000 - 2013)
Manufacturer Market Share Price Marginal Cost Markup Markup(%)
GM 21.06% $27,091 $22,067 $5,024 19.61%
TOYOTA 15.62% $25,445 $20,723 $4,722 19.74%
FORD 15.50% $25,336 $20,697 $4,639 19.03%
CHRYSLER 11.54% $24,462 $20,061 $4,400 18.41%
HONDA 10.23% $24,885 $20,385 $4,499 18.93%
NISSAN 7.52% $25,024 $20,587 $4,437 19.24%
HYUNDAI 4.26% $20,643 $16,521 $4,123 20.78%
KIA 2.97% $19,394 $15,366 $4,028 21.60%
VOLKSWAGEN 2.41% $23,927 $19,546 $4,381 19.26%
BMW 2.29% $44,995 $38,768 $6,227 14.53%
SUBARU 2.12% $22,760 $18,648 $4,112 18.28%
DAIMLER 1.99% $49,381 $42,830 $4,042 14.35%
MAZDA 1.90% $20,774 $16,732 $6,551 20.15%
MERCEDES 1.60% $57,831 $51,760 $4,055 11.17%
AUDI 0.92% $41,880 $36,674 $5,206 12.74%
MITSUBISHI 0.62% $21,917 $17,862 $6,071 19.06%
SUZUKI 0.53% $19,110 $15,357 $3,753 20.27%
GEELY1 0.42% $35,943 $30,999 $6,760 13.89%
TATA1 0.38% $62,536 $55,775 $4,944 11.16%
PORSCHE 0.22% $64,761 $58,031 $6,730 10.87%
SAAB 0.05% $24,437 $20,720 $3,717 16.13%
ISUZU 0.05% $33,815 $28,379 $5,437 15.86%
Note: Both Volvo and Jaguar LandRover were subsidiaries of Ford company. Ford decided to
sell Volvo to Chinese automotive company, Geely, in 2009 and sell Jaguar LandRover to Indian
automotive company, Tata Motors in 2008.
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Table 2.18: Average Market Share, Price, Marginal Cost, Markup and Markup(%)
Estimates by Manufacturers: All HEVs (2009 - 2013)
Manufacturer Market Share Price Marginal Cost Markup Markup(%)
2009
TOYOTA 69.41% $28,005 $22,045 $5,959 21.92%
HONDA 12.84% $23,782 $18,210 $5,572 23.60%
FORD 10.81% $29,752 $24,312 $5,439 18.33%
GM 3.61% $36,231 $30,628 $5,603 16.87%
NISSAN 3.33% $26,911 $21,825 $5,085 18.90%
2010
TOYOTA 72.31% $27,208 $22,167 $5,040 19.41%
HONDA 12.85% $21,382 $16,639 $4,743 22.39%
FORD 12.26% $29,734 $24,674 $5,059 17.05%
NISSAN 2.57% $26,439 $21,607 $4,832 18.30%
2011
TOYOTA 68.59% $26,915 $22,001 $4,914 18.74%
HONDA 12.16% $20,805 $15,864 $4,941 23.92%
FORD 10.44% $32,088 $26,977 $5,111 16.05%
HYUNDAI 7.57% $27,142 $22,281 $4,861 17.90%
NISSAN 1.25% $28,081 $23,117 $4,964 17.70%
2012
TOYOTA 72.36% $26,703 $22,086 $4,617 17.72%
GM 7.81% $29,016 $24,235 $4,781 16.61%
FORD 7.78% $29,009 $24,256 $4,754 16.57%
HYUNDAI 5.19% $26,445 $22,184 $4,261 16.10%
HONDA 4.30% $22,088 $17,746 $4,343 19.86%
KIA 2.56% $26,700 $22,460 $4,240 15.90%
2013
TOYOTA 65.03% $27,456 $23,044 $4,412 16.60%
FORD 17.26% $27,268 $23,069 $4,199 15.54%
GM 5.14% $29,081 $24,758 $4,323 15.00%
HYUNDAI 4.66% $26,542 $22,418 $4,124 15.50%
HONDA 3.69% $22,301 $18,198 $4,103 18.55%
KIA 3.01% $26,433 $22,354 $4,079 15.40%
VOLKSWAGEN 1.22% $27,799 $23,544 $4,255 15.30%
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Table 2.19: Average Markup Comparison of Toyota’s HEV Models (2000 - 2013)
HEV Model Price
Marginal
Cost
Markup Markup(%)
Avalon Hybrid $36,001 $31,154 $4,847 13.50%
Camry Hybrid $27,772 $22,577 $5,195 18.68%
CT 200h Hybrid $32,062 $27,076 $4,985 15.58%
ES 300h Hybrid $39,943 $34,938 $5,006 12.51%
Highlander Hybrid $37,822 $32,129 $5,693 15.09%
HS 250h Hybrid $37,819 $32,125 $5,694 15.06%
Prius $24,002 $19,027 $4,975 20.76%
RX 400h Hybrid $45,744 $39,262 $6,483 14.17%
RX 450h Hybrid $46,357 $39,567 $6,789 14.68%
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Table 2.20: Average Markup Comparison between TOYOTA’s HEV Models and Gasoline Counterparts (2000 - 2013)
Model Price
Marginal
Cost
Markup Markup(%)
Price
Premium
Marginal
Cost
Difference
Markup
Difference
Avalon $31,829 $27,371 $4,458 14.00%
$4,172 $3,783 $389
Avalon Hybrid $36,001 $31,154 $4,847 13.46%
Camry $21,974 $17,501 $4,473 20.36%
$5,798 $5,076 $722
Camry Hybrid $27,772 $22,577 $5,195 18.70%
Corolla $17,210 $13,014 $4,196 24.38%
$6,792 $6,013 $779
Prius $24,002 $19,027 $4,975 20.72%
Lexus ES 350 $37,127 $32,248 $4,879 13.14%
$6,608 $6,311 $297
Lexus ES 300h $43,735 $38,559 $5,176 11.83%
Highlander $29,503 $24,705 $4,798 16.26%
$8,319 $7,424 $895
Highlander Hybrid $37,822 $32,129 $5,693 15.05%
Lexus RX 350 $41,251 $35,288 $5,963 14.45%
$4,909 $4,181 $728
Lexus RX 400h $46,160 $39,469 $6,691 14.49%
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Figure 2.1: Cumulative Sales of Top 5 Best-Selling HEV Models
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Table 2.21: Markup Comparison: Prius vs. Other LDVs (2013)
Manufacturer Model Segmentation Price
Marginal
Cost
Markup
Markup
(%)
Hybrid
DODGE Avenger Lower Middle $21,374 $17,577 $3,797 17.77% NO
VOLKSWAGEN Passat Lower Middle $21,424 $17,699 $3,725 17.39% NO
HYUNDAI Tucson Small Cross Utility $22,102 $18,332 $3,770 17.06% NO
RAM Ram Tradesman Small Van $22,131 $18,738 $3,394 15.33% NO
NISSAN Altima Lower Middle $22,592 $18,777 $3,815 16.88% NO
TOYOTA Prius Upper Middle $23,785 $19,510 $4,275 17.97% YES
CHEVROLET Camaro Middle Specialty $24,305 $20,329 $3,976 16.36% NO
BUICK Verano Lower Middle $24,379 $20,258 $4,121 16.90% NO
BUICK Encore Small Cross Utility $24,834 $20,624 $4,210 16.95% NO
HONDA Civic Hybrid Upper Small $25,171 $20,907 $4,264 16.94% YES
FORD C-Max Hybrid Upper Middle $25,735 $21,604 $4,131 16.05% YES
CHEVROLET Malibu Hybrid Upper Middle $25,834 $21,719 $4,115 15.93% YES
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Toyota’s HEV models, I pair 6 models with their gasoline counterparts except for CT
200h and HS 250h.8 All Toyota HEV models have higher markups than their gasoline
pairs, and markup differences vary by model. However, percentage markups for HEVs
are similar or slightly smaller than gasoline counterparts. For example, markup and
percentage markup differences of Lexus RX series pairs are $728 and 0.05%.
Finally, I compare average markup and percentage markup of Toyota Prius with
competing vehicle models in terms of price and segmentation. As shown in table 2.4,
the Toyota Prius is the top-selling HEV model in the U.S. market in that the Prius
alone accounts for 40% of total HEV market share in 2013 and it has been sold
1,485,076 units by the end of 2013 since its debut in 2000 (Figure 2.1). The comparison
results are presented in Table 2.21. The Prius enjoys larger markups and percentage
markups than other gasoline vehicles that belong to middle class. In addition, the
Prius turns out to have greater markup than other middle class HEV models. For
example, the Prius markup ($4,275) is greater than the Ford C-Max Hybrid ($4,131)
and Chevrolet Malibu hybrid ($4,115) although the price of Prius is lower than these
two HEV models.
2.6 Conclusion
This study explores the evidence of quality-based price discrimination in the
automobile industry that arises from the fuel savings benefit of HEV technology.
Using a structural estimation of differentiated product model of new vehicle demand
and supply, I estimate marginal costs, markups and percentage markups for all vehicle
models, and analyze the extent of quality-based price discrimination by comparing
markup and percentage markup differences between HEVs and conventional gasoline
vehicles.
8There is no exact comparable gasoline counterpart for Toyota’s Prius. Instead, I can pair Prius
with Corolla in terms of attributes and amenities by following suggestion from the Fuel Economy
Guide.
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The results show that HEVs, on average, have larger markups than gasoline
vehicles, but have similar or smaller percentage markups than gasoline vehicles.
Further analysis on the relationship between market power and markups reveal that
firms with higher market power are associated with higher markups and percentage
markups. Average markups and percentage markups of HEVs produced by major
automobile manufacturers (Toyota, Honda, Ford, GM and Nissan) are higher than
those of new HEV market entrants (Hyundai, KIA and Volkswagen). I also find that
the Toyota Prius, the top-selling HEV model in the U.S. particularly enjoys larger
markups and percentage markups than its competitors.
While this study employs the structural model of demand and supply to overcome
drawbacks of a simple discrete choice model of demand, the results I present here still
have room for discussion and improvement. Estimated marginal costs, markups are
computed using parameter estimates from the demand side model. The simultaneous
estimation of parameters from both demand and cost side models would allow us to
have more precise and realistic parameter estimates for the analysis (BLP 1995; Sudhir
2001). In addition, marginal utility of income, αi, is interacted with only the observed
household income variable. Interacting with additional demographic variables such
as education level, family size and age would help to understand how consumer
heterogeneity in vehicle choice varies with demographics, though it requires increased
parameter estimation space. The estimation results are derived from market-level
data. As Petrin (2002) and BLP (2004) show, combining market-level data with
supplemental consumer-level data would improve the identification of the parameter
estimates by adding extra moment conditions in the objective function. Finally,
this study does not take into account dynamics in market environment that have
significant impacts on HEV premiums. On the demand side, consumers’ willingness-
to-pay for HEVs varies over time as the number of innovators or environmentally
friendly consumers changes. Production costs are also characterized dynamically
rather than statically and those costs evolves over time via scale and learning effects.
These issues are left for future studies.
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Chapter 3
Adoption of an Environmentally
Friendly Product with
Heterogeneous Environmental
Concerns
3.1 Introduction
It is a well-known fact that firms offer different qualities of the same or similar
products to appeal to consumers with different preferences. This practice is known
as product differentiation. One reason for product differentiation is the phenomenon
of heterogeneous preferences among consumers (Belleflamme and Peitz 2010). The
concepts of product differentiation and heterogeneous preferences are relevant to
automobile manufacturers who produce both conventional gasoline vehicles and
environmentally friendly fuel-efficient hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs) for consumers
with heterogeneous preferences for environmentally-friendly technologies. Although
HEVs provide higher fuel economy than conventional gasoline vehicles, the empirical
literature on HEVs has shown that fuel economy is generally not consumers’ sole
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reason for purchasing them (Heffner et al. 2007; Kahn 2007; Klein 2007; Sexton
2011). For consumers with environmental concerns (so-called green consumers), the
fact that the HEVs emit fewer pollutants than conventional gasoline vehicles may be
what motivates their purchase of an HEV, and such consumers may be willing to pay
more for HEVs because of their quality of environmental friendliness. In this paper, we
provide a model of the automobile market where consumers choose between gasoline
vehicles and hybrid vehicles and consumers have heterogeneous preferences, caring
about both the environment and the physical quality of the product–specifically its
fuel economy.
Our model examines three consumer groups according to their environmental
concerns: 1) gasoline vehicle consumers, 2) HEV consumers, and 3) consumers who
decide not to buy any vehicles because of their concern for environmental protection.
Many of our findings are to be expected. Demand for each vehicle type is negatively
associated not only with increases in the price of the vehicles but also with increases
in consumers’ concerns about environmental damage (specifically emissions); demand
for both vehicle-types increases when vehicles are equipped with better fuel economy
technology; and, conversely, demand for both vehicle-types falls as consumers become
more pro-environmental. In addition to these expected findings, we also make one
interesting finding with respect to environmental protection policies. By taking into
account the heterogeneity of consumer preferences, we show that a tax on gasoline
vehicles will always generate a decrease in total emissions, while a subsidy for the
adoption of environmentally friendly HEVs may not.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 reviews literature on product
differentiation. Section 3.3 describes the model, Sections 3.4 and 3.5 discuss market
outcomes under two different assumptions-first, a perfectly competitive automobile
market and second, a hybrid vehicle monopoly market, and Section 3.6 presents
conclusions based on the model.
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3.2 Literature Review
The pioneer study of the literature on quality-based product differentiation by a
monopolist is Mussa and Rosen (1978). The study shows that imperfect quality
discrimination by a monopolist results in optimal level of quality of products for high
willingness to pay consumers but degrading quality of products for low willingness to
pay consumers.1 This quality distortion makes the monopolist to have higher profits
by segmenting markets, and preventing higher willingness to pay consumers from
switching to low quality products that give lower profits. The primary reason for
quality distortion is threatening high willingness to pay consumers, not hurting low
willingness to pay consumers. Contrary to the results from Mussa and Rosen (1978),
Donnenfeld and White (1988) and Srinagesh and Bradburd (1989) demonstrate that
quality distortion by a monopolist can actually lead to a form of quality improvement
rather than quality degradation. The key difference between these studies from
the model of Mussa and Rosen (1978) is the assumption of relationship between
consumers’ total and marginal valuations of product quality. Muss and Rosen (1978)
assume the positive association between total and marginal valuation of the quality,
which results in quality degradation of low quality products. However, when a
negative relationship is assumed, quality distortion occurs as the form of quality
enhancement for high quality products.
A sizable literature has extended the model of Mussa and Rosen (1978) to the
duopoly or oligopoly competition. While there are mixed results among studies,
the literature concludes that only a limited number of firms with positive market
shares can survive at equilibrium as a result of price competition. Gabszewicz and
Thisse (1979, 1980) first study the price competition in a vertically differentiated
market. Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) present a model of price competition in
a differentiated duopoly. The non-cooperative market outcomes show that some
1Other studies that have similar conclusions include Maskin and Riley (1984), Cooper (1984),
Phlips (1983), Itoh (1983) and Gabszewicz et al. (1986).
67
consumers do not buy anything or all consumers buy either of the two products.
The likelihood of realization of each market outcome depends on the degree of
product differentiation and income distribution. Gabszewicz and Thisse (1980) extend
duopoly to oligopolistic competition. They find that a fixed number of firms can have
positive market shares. Entry of a new firm into the market inevitably entails the
exit of an existing firm, and this process forces the equilibrium prices to decrease
to the competitive level. Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983) discuss price competition
under vertical differentiation. Shaked and Sutton (1982) present a game theoretical
model that analyzes monopolistic competition in differentiated products market.
The Perfect Nash Equilibrium is one in which only two firms enter the market and
provide differentiated products with distinctive qualities, and make positive profits
at equilibrium. Shaked and Sutton (1983) show that there exists an upper bound
independent of product qualities, to the number of firms with positive market shares
at a Nash Equilibrium in prices in the market with vertical differentiation. Low fixed
costs, independent of optimal quality choice by a firm and price competition guarantee
a limited number of firms at equilibrium.
While most of the theoretical literature on product differentiation in oligopoly
assumes that each firm provides a single quality, there are studies that demonstrate
the idea that duopolists offer multiple qualities rather than a single quality.
Champsaur and Rochet (1989) develops a model where two firms compete with
each other by offering a range of product qualities. They assume that given quality
level is purchased by different type of consumers, and find the existence of unique
price equilibria where firms’ quality range is an interval. They also show that
the Chamberlinian incentive for product differentiation dominates for intermediate
qualities so that there is always a subset of intermediate qualities that are not offered
to consumers. Cheng et al. (2011) find that each duopolist produces single quality
for any concave cost function of quality improvement. However, when strictly convex
cost function is assumed and the market coverage is endogenously determined by
firms, each firm offers a disconnected continuum of multiple qualities. They also
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show that consumer surplus and social welfare are greater under multi-qualities than
single-quality duopoly.
Products are differentiated not only by qualities but also by brand names. Katz
(1984) assumes positive correlation between brand sensitivity and quality sensitivity
across consumers, which implies consumers become more brand sensitive as one moves
up the quality level. He argues that a firm with good reputation or strong brand
image sells products only to the brand-sensitive consumers in order to maximize
the profits at the upper end of the quality spectrum, whereas a firm with a low
value of reputation would serve brand-insensitive consumers. Gilbert and Matutes
(1993) show that the range of product lines depends on the degree of band-specific
differentiation if differentiated products offered by rival firms are being treated as
close substitutes by consumers. With a credible commitment on the restriction of
product offerings, firms would specialize in products if brand-specific differentiation
is small, but firms offer full product lines as brand-specific differentiation gets larger.
There is a branch of literature that analyzes the provisions of environmental
quality when consumers have different awareness of environmental concern. Mahenc
and Podesta (2012) examine the provision of environmental quality by a monopolist
when environmental quality is a non-excludable vertical characteristic of monopolized
good. They find similar results from Mussa and Rosen (1978) that the monopolist
offers goods only to the high-demand consumers with efficient level of environmental
quality when the group of high-demand consumers are large, and the monopolist
provides the inefficiently low level of environmental quality when the group of
low-demand consumers are large. Conard (2005) develops a duopoly model of
vertical product differentiation incorporating the environmental awareness of the
consumers. Nash-equilibria of prices, market shares and profits are affected by
both consumer awareness about the environment and the higher production costs.
Cremer and Thisse (1999) and Bansal and Gangopadhyay (2003) study the effects of
environmental and tax-subsidy policies on the allocation of environmental quality
in an imperfectly competitive market in the presence of environmentally aware
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consumers. A commodity tax and a discriminatory subsidy can results in welfare
enhancing.
3.3 Model
3.3.1 The Utility
This model posits a consumer who considers purchasing either a conventional gasoline
vehicle or an environmentally friendly hybrid vehicle. Each preference is represented
thus:
ui =

vg − pg − tγdg if buys a gasoline vehicle of quality vg at price pg,
vh − ph − tγdh if buys a hybrid vehicle of quality vh at price ph,
0 if buys nothing.
where ui is the consumer i’s indirect utility function. The two vehicle types are
indexed by j = {g, h} where g and h respectively refer to the gasoline vehicle and the
hybrid vehicle. The variable vj denotes the quality of each vehicle type measured in
fuel economy. Since a hybrid vehicle has better fuel economy than a gasoline vehicle,
we take vg < vh. γ to be the environmental concern parameter, which is distributed
across consumers according to the cumulative distribution function, F (γ). Consumers
with higher γ attach more value to (i.e. care more about) environmental protection,
so the higher the value of γ, the more pro-environmental the consumer is. The scalar
variable t measures consumers’ preference regarding the environment. As t increases,
the distribution of environmental concerns increases to some extent. We assume that
when consumers buy a vehicle, they perceive a disutility of environmental damage, dj
(emissions from a vehicle).2 The environmental damage, dj, is a decreasing function
2Air pollution from vehicles is negative externality, which imposes higher social costs. The utility
function of a consumer i with negative externality can be written as ui = vj − pj − tγdj −βE where
E is the total environmental damage from the vehicles. We can drop E from the model since an
individual cannot control E, and it will not affect our main results significantly. Even though each
individual’s impact on the total emissions is small, our model assumes that each individual still
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of vehicle quality and is greater for gasoline vehicles than for hybrid vehicles, dg > dh.
Furthermore, we also assume that the unit cost of producing each vehicle type, C(vj)
increases with quality, vj, and that C(vg) = cg and C(vh) = ch.
Assumption 3.1. Let (vj − cj) be the gross surplus from buying each type of vehicle,
where j = {g, h}. The following condition then holds:
(vg − cg) > (vh − ch) or (vh − vg) < (ch − cg)
Assumption 3.1 implies that the additional cost of producing hybrid vehicles is
greater than the fuel cost savings.
The following constraints must be satisfied for all consumers. First, in order for a
consumer to be willing to buy a gasoline vehicle, the net surplus of buying a gasoline
vehicle must be positive. This is the individual rationality constraint, or IR:
vg − pg − tγIRg dg > 0 (3.1)
Rearranging Equation (3.1) yields
γ <
vg − pg
tdg
≡ γIRg (3.2)
and vg − pg > 0. Therefore, consumers with an environmental concern parameter of
less than γIRg will buy a gasoline vehicle. The second constraint requires that the
consumer of a gasoline vehicle will prefer to buy a gasoline vehicle but not a hybrid
vehicle. This is the incentive compatibility constraint, or IC:
vg − pg − tγICdg > vh − ph − tγICdh (3.3)
γICt(dg − dh) < vg − vh − pg + ph (3.4)
cares about the damage that they impose on the environment, which is captured by γ. γ can be
interpreted as a negative felling of guilty or regret about the damage that the individual imposes on
the environment by driving a car. In addition, the magnitude of γ may be bigger than β because
it includes not only from the environmental effects but also social and psychological effects on the
individual.
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γ <
(vg − pg)− (vh − ph)
t(dg − dh) ≡ γ
IC (3.5)
The IR and IC constraints for the hybrid vehicle consumers can be written thus:
γ <
vh − ph
tdg
≡ γIRh (3.6)
γ >
(vg − pg)− (vh − ph)
t(dg − dh) ≡ γ
IC (3.7)
3.4 A Perfectly Competitive Automobile Market
In this model, we initially suppose that both gasoline vehicles and hybrid vehicle are
sold in a perfectly competitive automobile market so that the price for a vehicle is
equal to its marginal cost, pg = cg and ph = ch, which yields zero profit from selling
any vehicle.
3.4.1 Demands
Under the assumption of a perfectly competitive automobile market, the IR and IC
constraints for consumers of gasoline vehicles can be written thus:
γ <
vg − cg
tdg
≡ γIRg (3.8)
γ <
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh) ≡ γ
IC (3.9)
Similarly, the IR and IC constraints for consumers of hybrid vehicles are
γ <
vh − ch
tdg
≡ γIRh (3.10)
γ >
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh) ≡ γ
IC (3.11)
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Lemma 3.1. In a perfectly competitive automobile market assumption, we have
γIC < γIRg < γ
IR
h (3.12)
as shown in Figure 3.1, implying that all consumers with γ < γIC will drive gasoline
vehicles, that consumers with γIC < γ < γIRh will be willing to drive hybrid vehicles
and that consumers with γ > γIRh will walk rather than driving a car.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Figure 3.1: Vehicle Choices among Consumers with respect to Distribution of γ.
The demand for the gasoline vehicles, Dg(v, c, t, d) and the demand for hybrid
vehicles, Dh(v, c, t, d) can now be derived under the assumption of a perfectly
competitive automobile market:
Dg(v, c, t, d) = F (γ
IC) (3.13)
Dh(v, c, t, d) =
[
F (γIRh )− F (γIC)
]
(3.14)
where γIC ≡ (vg−cg)−(vh−ch)
t(dg−dh) , γ
IR
h ≡ vh−chtdh and F (γ) is CDF of γ.
3.4.2 Comparative Statics Analysis
Table 3.1 summarizes the comparative statics analysis of the demand for gasoline
vehicles and the demand for hybrid vehicles. The full comparative statics analysis is
provided in the Appendix A.2.
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Table 3.1: Comparative Statics Analysis of a Perfectly Competitive Automobile
Market
ddg ddh dcg dch dvg dvh dt
dDg(d, c, v, t) − + − + + − −
dDh(d, c, v, t) + − + − − + −
Proposition 3.1.
(i) The demand for gasoline vehicles increases in response to an increase in dh, ch,
vg, and the demand for gasoline vehicles decreases in response to an increase in dg,
cg, vh.
(ii) The demand for hybrid vehicles increases in response to an increase in dg, cg, vh,
and the demand for gasoline vehicles decreases in response to an increase in dh, ch,
vg.
(iii) Other things being equal, an increase in t decreases the both demand for gasoline
vehicles and the demand for hybrid vehicles.
Increases in dj and cj make each vehicle type less attractive (j = {g, h}).
Consumers who are indifferent between buying a gasoline vehicle and buying a hybrid
vehicle will switch to the other vehicle types. In the case of hybrid vehicles, consumers
who are indifferent between buying a hybrid vehicle and walking (buying no vehicle)
will decide against buying a vehicle as ch rises, which will generate a further decrease
in the demand for hybrid vehicles. The demand for each vehicle type, Dj(d, c, v, t),
increases as vehicles are equipped with better fuel economy technology, vj. As
consumers become more pro-environmental, t, consumers of gasoline vehicles with
higher γ will decide to buy hybrid vehicles, thereby decreasing the demand for gasoline
vehicles and increasing the demand for hybrid vehicles. At the same time, however,
consumers of hybrid vehicles who have higher environmental concerns will decide not
to buy any kind of vehicle as their environmental concerns grow, thereby decreasing
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the demand for hybrid vehicles. The net effect of increases in t on the demand for
hybrid vehicles is negative by Lemma 3.1. See Appendix A.2 for details.
3.4.3 Policy Implications
This section examines two important policy implications: 1) the effects of the model
parameters on the total environmental damage, and 2) the effect of a government
subsidy of hybrid vehicles on the total environmental damage.
3.4.3.1 Environmental Damage
Aggregate environmental damage, E, is defined as the sum of vehicle emissions from
gasoline vehicles and hybrid vehicles:
E =
γIC∫
0
[f(γ) · dg]dγ +
γIRh∫
γIC
[f(γ) · dh]dγ (3.15)
where dg and dh respectively represent emissions from gasoline vehicles and hybrid
vehicles, and γIC ≡ (vg−cg)−(vh−ch)
t(dg−dh) , γ
IR
h ≡ vh−chtdh and f(γ) is the probability density
function of γ.
Table 3.2 provides the comparative statics analysis of total environmental
damages, considering various functional forms of γ. Computational details of the
comparative statics analysis are provided in the Appendix A.4.1.
Proposition 3.2.
(i) Other things being equal, an increase in cg decreases total emissions, as does an
increase in t, while an increase in vg increases total emissions.
(ii) If f(γIRh ) > f(γ
IC), then total emissions decrease in response to an increase in
dg, dh and ch, and total emissions increase in response to vh and sh.
(iii) If f(γIRh ) < f(γ
IC), then total emissions decrease in response to an increase in
vh and sh, and total emissions increase in response to dg, dh and ch.
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Table 3.2: Comparative Statics Analysis of the Total Environmental Damage in a
Perfectly Competitive Automobile Market
ddg ddh dcg dch dvg dvh dt dτg dsh
General Case dE ≶ ≶ − ≶ + ≶ − − ≶
Uniform
Distribution
F (γ) = γ
dE 0 0 − 0 + 0 − − 0
Generalized
Uniform
Distribution (1)
F (γ) = γ2,
f(γIRh ) > f(γ
IC)
dE − − − − + + − − +
Generalized
Uniform
Distribution (2)
F (γ) = γ1/2,
f(γIRh ) < f(γ
IC)
dE + + − + + − − − −
When cg and t increase, consumers will switch to hybrid vehicles, and total
emissions will decrease. However, if gasoline vehicles are equipped with better fuel
economy, vg, consumers will decide to buy gasoline vehicles, with a resulting increase
in total emissions.
dg, dh, ch, vh and sh have two opposing effects on the total emissions, so that the
net effect on total emissions is generally ambiguous and depends on the probability
density function of γ, f(γ). As dg increases, consumers who are driving gasoline
vehicles now do more damage to the environment. However, consumers who are
indifferent between gasoline vehicles and hybrid vehicles will switch to hybrid vehicles,
which will cause total emission to fall. Likewise, as dh rises, drivers of hybrid vehicles
will cause more environmental damage and consumers who are indifferent between
gasoline vehicles and hybrid vehicles will switch to gasoline vehicles, thereby further
increasing the total emissions. However, consumers who are indifferent between
buying hybrid vehicles or walking will decide not to buy any vehicle at all, in order to
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protect the environment, thereby decreasing the total emissions. Changes in ch and
vh also have mixed effects. As ch increases, consumers who are indifferent between
gasoline vehicles and hybrid vehicles will decide to buy gasoline vehicles, increasing
the total emissions. However, consumers who are indifferent between buying hybrid
vehicles and walking will decide to walk, so that and the total emissions decrease.
As vh increases, consumers who are indifferent between gasoline vehicles and hybrid
vehicles will switch to hybrid vehicles, which will cause the total emissions to fall.
At the same time, however, consumers who are indifferent between buying hybrid
vehicles and walking will decide to buy hybrid vehicles as hybrid vehicles become
more environmentally friendly, which will result in an increases in total emissions.
In light of Proposition 3.2, it follow immediately that ∂E
∂τg
= ∂E
∂cg
and ∂E
∂sh
= − ∂E
∂ch
where τg is a tax on gasoline vehicles, and sh is a subsidy (e.g. a tax incentive or
rebate) for consumers of hybrid vehicle.
Corollary 3.1 (to Proposition 3.2). A tax on gasoline vehicles will reduce total
emissions, and a subsidy for HEVs has an ambiguous effect on total emissions.
A subsidy will encourage gasoline vehicle consumers to switch to hybrid vehicles,
which will cause total emissions to fall. At the same time, however, when offered
a subsidy, consumers who have previously used to walk will decide to buy hybrid
vehicles, which will increase the emissions from hybrid vehicles. The net effect
depends on the probability density function of γ, f(γ).
3.5 The Hybrid Vehicle Monopolist
The Hybrid Vehicle Monopolist Model relaxes the assumption of a perfectly com-
petitive automobile market, assuming instead that an automobile manufacturer has
a market power in the hybrid vehicle market and can charge a price for the hybrid
vehicle above the marginal cost.
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3.5.1 Demands
For any ph such that vh ≥ ph ≥ ch, we can write:
γIRh ≡
vh − ph
tdh
(3.16)
γIC ≡ (vg − cg)− (vh − ph)
t(dg − dh) (3.17)
γIC < γIRg < γ
IR
h (3.18)
The demand for the gasoline vehicle, Dg(v, c, p, t, d), and the demand for the
hybrid vehicle, Dh(v, c, p, t, d), are
Dg(v, c, p, t, d) = F (γ
IC) (13)
Dh(v, c, p, t, d) =
[
F (γIRh )− F (γIC)
]
(14)
where γIC ≡ (vg−cg)−(vh−ph)
t(dg−dh) and γ
IR
h ≡ vh−phtdh .
3.5.2 Profit Maximization Problem for The Hybrid Vehicle
Monopolist
The monopolist can find the profit maximizing price for the hybrid vehicle by solving
the following profit function:
max
ph
Π = (ph − ch)Dh(v, c, p, t, d)
= (ph − ch)
[
F (γIRh )− F (γIC)
] (3.19)
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The first order condition for the profit function with respect to ph can be written
as
∂Π
∂ph
≡ Πph =
[
F (γIRh )− F (γIC)
]
+ (p∗h − ch)
[
−f(γ
IR
h )
tdh
− f(γ
IC)
t(dg − dh)
]
= 0 (3.20)
And corresponding second order condition is given by
∂2Π
∂ph2
≡ Πphph = −2
[
f(γIRh )
tdh
+
f(γIC)
t(dg − dh)
]
+ (p∗h − ch)
[
f ′(γIRh )
t2dh
2 −
f ′(γIC)
t2(dg − dh)2
]
< 0
(3.21)
Rearranging the FOC (3.20) yields
p∗h = ch +
[
F (γIRh )− F (γIC)
][
f(γIRh )·(dg−dh)+f(γIC)·dh
tdh(dg−dh)
] (3.22)
and
p∗h = ch +
t
[
F (γIRh )− F (γIC)
][
f(γIRh )·(dg−dh)+f(γIC)·dh
dh(dg−dh)
] (3.23)
where the monopoly price for the hybrid vehicle, p∗h, is the sum of marginal cost
(ch) and the markup, the second term of the right-hand side of Equation (3.23).
Other things being equal, the monopolist can increase p∗h as consumers become more
pro-environmental (t), and as the demand for hybrid vehicles
[
F (γIRh )− F (γIC)
]
increases.
However, Equation (3.23) does not provide a reduced form solution for p∗h. Instead,
we solve for p∗h in Equation (3.24) assuming γ is uniformly distributed on [0,1]. See
Appendix A.3 for details.
p∗h =
(vh + ch)
2
− dh(vg − cg)
2dg
(3.24)
And corresponding F (γIRh ∗) and F (γIC∗) are respectively given by
F (γIRh ∗) =
dh(vg − cg) + dg(vh − ch)
2tdgdh
(3.25)
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F (γIC∗) = (2dg − dh)(vg − cg)− dg(vh − ch)
2tdg(dg − dh) (3.26)
Finally, the demands for both gasoline vehicles and hybrid vehicles are provided
respectively by
D∗g(v, c, t, d) = F (γ
IC∗) = (2dg − dh)(vg − cg)− dg(vh − ch)
2tdg(dg − dh) (3.27)
D∗h(v, c, t, d) =
[
F (γIRh ∗)− F (γIC∗)
]
=
dg(vh − ch)− dh(vg − cg)
2tdh(dg − dh) (3.28)
For a numerical example, let dg = 3, dh = 1, vg = 5, cg = 2, vh = 6, ch = 4
and t = 1. Then, F (γIC∗) = 0.75, F (γIRh ∗) = 1.5, p∗h = 4.5, D∗g(v, c, t, d) = 0.75 and
D∗h(v, c, t, d) = 0.75.
3.5.3 Comparative Statics Analysis
Table 3.3 presents the comparative statics analysis of the Monopoly Hybrid Vehicle
Price, p∗h, in order to examine the effects of the model parameters on the monopoly
price. The computational details of the comparative statics analysis are presented in
the Appendix A.3.
Table 3.3: Comparative Statics Analysis of the Monopoly Hybrid Vehicle Price
ddg ddh dcg dch dvg dvh
dph(d, c, v) + − + + − +
Proposition 3.3.
The monopoly hybrid vehicle price increases in response to an increase in dg, cg, ch,
vh and the monopoly hybrid vehicle price decreases in response to an increase in dh
and vg.
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3.5.4 Policy Implications
We now turn our attention to the effects of the model parameters and the efficacy of
a government subsidy of hybrid vehicles as a means of reducing total environmental
damage.
3.5.4.1 Environmental Damage
Table 3.4 provides the comparative statics analysis of the total environmental damages
for the Hybrid Vehicle Monopolist Model. The signs of comparative statics analysis
are the same as in the model that assumes a perfectly competitive automobile
market, but the magnitudes of the effects are different. Computational details of
the comparative statics analysis are provided in the Appendix A.4.2.
Table 3.4: Comparative Statics Analysis of Total Environmental Damage in the
Hybrid Vehicle Monopolist Model
ddg ddh dcg dch dvg dvh dt dτg dsh
General Case dE ≶ ≶ − ≶ + ≶ − − ≶
Uniform
Distribution
F (γ) = γ
dE 0 0 − 0 + 0 − − 0
Generalized
Uniform
Distribution (1)
F (γ) = γ2,
f(γIRh ) > f(γ
IC)
dE − − − − + + − − +
Generalized
Uniform
Distribution (2)
F (γ) = γ1/2,
f(γIRh ) < f(γ
IC)
dE + + − + + − − − −
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3.6 Conclusion
The model developed in this study assumes that consumers are heterogeneous with
respect to their preferences toward environmental concerns and also care about the
physical quality of the product. It considers three consumer groups according to
their environmental concerns. By applying this model to the automobile market,
we show that heterogeneous environmental concerns have similar effects in both a
perfectly competitive market and a hybrid vehicle monopoly market. Many of our
results are to be expected: consumers buy fewer vehicles as environmental damages
and prices of vehicles increase. More vehicles are sold when vehicles are equipped
with better fuel economy technology. Consumers buy fewer vehicles as they become
more concerned about the environment. In addition, we show that unintended
consequences arise because of consumer heterogeneity with regard to environmental
concerns. Specifically, taxing gasoline vehicles always improves environmental quality,
while government supports for environmentally friendly HEV adoption do not always
result in decrease in total emissions.
One underlying assumption of the model presented here is that it does not allow
for implicit changes in driving patterns: consumers either buy a car or not. In future
research, the model could be extended to incorporate consumers’ choices about how
much to drive based on the benefits and damages they experience from driving each
type of a car. Another worthwhile direction for future research would be to analyze
the simultaneous effects of product characteristics on the demand for each vehicle
type as well as total emissions. A third direction for future research would be to use
the model to find the optimal level of vehicle type for maximizing the social welfare:
endogenous product choice.
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Appendix A
Adoption of an Environmentally
Friendly Product with
Heterogeneous Environmental
Concerns
A.1 Proof of Lemma 3.1
Since we don’t know magnitudes of γIRg , γ
IC and γIRh , we need to consider following
6 cases and examine whether each case satisfies necessary conditions.
1) Case 1: γIRg < γ
IC < γIRh . In this case, the relationship should satisfies following
three conditions.
1. γIRg − γIC ≡ −dh(vg−cg)+dg(vh−ch)tdg(dg−dh) < 0 which implies dg(vh − ch) < dh(vg − cg)
2. γIC − γIRh ≡ dh(vg−cg)−dg(vh−ch)tdh(dg−dh) < 0 which implies dh(vg − cg) < dg(vh − ch)
3. γIRg − γIRh ≡ dh(vg−cg)−dg(vh−ch)tdgdh < 0 which implies dh(vg − cg) < dg(vh − ch)
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Comparing results in a contradiction since dg(vh− ch) < dh(vg− cg) and dh(vg− cg) <
dg(vh − ch) are incompatible. Therefore, we can ignore case 1.
2) Case 2: γIRg < γ
IR
h < γ
IC
1. γIRg − γIRh ≡ dh(vg−cg)−dg(vh−ch)tdgdh < 0 which implies dh(vg − cg) < dg(vh − ch)
2. γIRh − γIC ≡ −dh(vg−cg)+dg(vh−ch)tdh(dg−dh) < 0 which implies dg(vh − ch) < dh(vg − cg)
3. γIRg − γIC ≡ −dh(vg−cg)+dg(vh−ch)tdg(dg−dh) < 0 which implies dg(vh − ch) < dh(vg − cg)
Case 2 is also contradictory and we can ignore case 2 too.
3) Case 3: γIC < γIRg < γ
IR
h
1. γIC − γIRg ≡ dh(vg−cg)−dg(vh−ch)tdg(dg−dh) < 0 which implies dh(vg − cg) < dg(vh − ch)
2. γIRg − γIRh ≡ dh(vg−cg)−dg(vh−ch)tdgdh < 0 which implies dh(vg − cg) < dg(vh − ch)
3. γIC − γIRh ≡ dh(vg−cg)−dg(vh−ch)tdh(dg−dh) < 0 which implies dh(vg − cg) < dg(vh − ch)
Case 3 satisfies all required conditions. A simple numerical example illustrates the
relationship. Suppose dg = 3, dh = 1, vg = 5, cg = 2, vh = 6, ch = 4 and t = 1, then,
γIC = 1
2
, γIRg = 1 and γ
IR
h = 2. Figure A.1 shows the region of consumers’ choice of
each vehicle type according to γ.
Figure A.1: Vehicle Choices among Consumers with respect to Distribution of γ
(Case 3)
4) Case 4: γIC < γIRh < γ
IR
g
1. γIC − γIRh ≡ dh(vg−cg)−dg(vh−ch)tdh(dg−dh) < 0 which implies dh(vg − cg) < dg(vh − ch)
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2. γIRh − γIRg ≡ −dh(vg−cg)+dg(vh−ch)tdgdh < 0 which implies dg(vh − ch) < dh(vg − cg)
3. γIC − γIRg ≡ dh(vg−cg)−dg(vh−ch)tdg(dg−dh) < 0 which implies dh(vg − cg) < dg(vh − ch)
As a result, case 4 is also a contradiction.
5) Case 5: γIRh < γ
IR
g < γ
IC
1. γIRh − γIRg ≡ −dh(vg−cg)+dg(vh−ch)tdgdh < 0 which implies dg(vh − ch) < dh(vg − cg)
2. γIRg − γIC ≡ −dh(vg−cg)+dg(vh−ch)tdg(dg−dh) < 0 which implies dg(vh − ch) < dh(vg − cg)
3. γIRh − γIC ≡ −dh(vg−cg)+dg(vh−ch)tdh(dg−dh) < 0 which implies dg(vh − ch) < dh(vg − cg)
Therefore, case 5 also satisfies necessary conditions. Let dg = 2, dh = 1, vg = 10,
cg = 2, vh = 12, ch = 10 and t = 1. Then, γ
IR
h = 2, γ
IR
g = 4 and γ
IC = 6. As we can
see in Figure A.2, no hybrid vehicles are sold in case 5), and we can remove this case
too.
Figure A.2: Vehicle Choices among Consumers with respect to Distribution of γ
(Case 5)
6) Case 6: γIRh < γ
IC < γIRg
1. γIRh − γIC ≡ −dh(vg−cg)+dg(vh−ch)tdh(dg−dh) < 0 which implies dg(vh − ch) < dh(vg − cg)
2. γIC − γIRg ≡ dh(vg−cg)−dg(vh−ch)tdg(dg−dh) < 0 which implies dh(vg − cg) < dg(vh − ch)
3. γIRh − γIRg ≡ −dh(vg−cg)+dg(vh−ch)tdgdh < 0 which implies dg(vh − ch) < dh(vg − cg)
Case 6 also results in a contradiction.
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A.2 Comparative Statics Analysis of a Perfectly
Competitive Automobile Market
Recall demand functions for the gasoline vehicle and the hybrid vehicle.
Dg(v, c, t, d) = F (γ
IC)
Dh(v, c, t, d) =
[
F (γIRh )− F (γIC)
]
γIC ≡ (vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)
γIC ≡ (vg−cg)−(vh−ch)
t(dg−dh) and γ
IR
h ≡ vh−chtdh
First, we take partial derivatives of each demand with respect to dg to get
∂Dg(v, c, t, d)
∂dg
= −f(γIC)
[
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)2
]
< 0
∂Dh(v, c, t, d)
∂dg
= −f(γIC)
[
−{(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)}
t(dg − dh)2
]
> 0
Partial derivatives with respect to dh are given by
∂Dg(v, c, t, d)
∂dh
= −f(γIC)
[
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
−t(dg − dh)2
]
> 0
∂Dh(v, c, t, d)
∂dh
= −f(γIRh )
(
vh − ch
tdh
2
)
−
[
f(γIC)
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)2
)]
< 0
The signs of partial derivatives with respect to cg are
∂Dg(v, c, t, d)
∂cg
= f(γIC)
[ −1
t(dg − dh)
]
< 0
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∂Dh(v, c, d)
∂cg
= −f(γIC) ·
[ −1
t(dg − dh)
]
> 0
Similarly, the signs of partial derivatives with respect to ch are given by
∂Dg(v, c, t, d)
∂ch
= f(γIC)
[
1
t(dg − dh)
]
> 0
∂Dh(v, c, t, d)
∂ch
= f(γIRh )
(−1
tdh
)
− f(γIC)
[
1
t(dg − dh)
]
< 0
We find the signs of partial derivatives with respect to vg as
∂Dg(v, c, t, d)
∂vg
= f(γIC)
[
1
t(dg − dh)
]
> 0
∂Dh(v, c, t, d)
∂vg
= −f(γIC)
[
1
t(dg − dh)
]
< 0
Likewise, we find the signs of partial derivatives with respect to vh as
∂Dg(v, c, t, d)
∂vh
= f(γIC)
[ −1
t(dg − dh)
]
< 0
∂Dh(v, c, t, d)
∂vh
= f(γIRh )
1
tdh
− f(γIC)
[ −1
t(dg − dh)
]
> 0
Finally, taking partial derivatives with respect to t yields
∂Dg(v, c, t, d)
∂t
= f(γIC)
[
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
−t2(dg − dh)
]
< 0
∂Dh(v, c, t, d)
∂t
= f(γIRh )
[
(vh − ch)
−t2dh
]
+
[
f(γIC)
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t2(dg − dh)
)]
=
f(γIC)γIC − f(γIRh )γIRh
t
< 0
and γIRh > γ
IC by Lemma 3.1.
For example, if we assume γ is uniformly distributed on [0,1] so that F (γ) = γ and
101
f(γ) = 1. Then, ∂Dh(v,c,t,d)
∂t
= γIC − γIRh < 0. Instead, if we use a generalized uniform
distribution of F (γ) = γ2 and f(γ) = 2γ. Then, ∂Dh(v,c,t,d)
∂t
= −2
t
(
(γIRh )
2 − (γIC)2
)
<
0. Finally, if we use another generalized uniform distribution of F (γ) = γ1/2 and
f(γ) = 1
2
γ−1/2. Then, ∂Dh(v,c,t,d)
∂t
= − 1
2t
(
(γIRh )
1/2 − (γIC)1/2
)
< 0.
A.3 Comparative Statics Analysis of the Hybrid
Vehicle Monopolist
For comparative statics analysis, we assume γ is uniformly distributed on [0,1] where
0 < γIC < γIRh < 1. Applying uniform distribution, demands can be rewritten as
Dg(v, c, p, t, d) = F (γ
IC) =
(vg − cg)− (vh − ph)
t(dg − dh)
Dh(v, c, p, t, d) =
[
F (γIRh )− F (γIC)
]
=
(vh − ph)
tdh
− ((vg − cg)− (vh − ph))
t(dg − dh)
A.3.1 Profit Maximization Problem for the Hybrid Vehicle
Monopolist
The monopolist needs to find the profit maximizing price for the hybrid vehicle by
solving the following profit function:
max
ph
Π = (ph − ch)Dh(v, c, p, t, d)
= (ph − ch)
[
F (γIRh )− F (γIC)
]
= (ph − ch)
[
(vh − ph)
tdh
− ((vg − cg)− (vh − ph))
t(dg − dh)
]
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The first order condition for the profit function with respect to can be written as
∂Π
∂ph
≡ Πph =
[
(vh − ph)
tdh
− ((vg − cg)− (vh − ph))
t(dg − dh)
]
+ (p∗h − ch)
[
− 1
tdh
− 1
t(dg − dh)
]
= 0
And corresponding second order condition is given by
∂2Π
∂ph2
≡ Πphph = −2
[
1
tdh
+
1
t(dg − dh)
]
< 0
Rearranging the FOC to find profit maximizing monopoly price for the hybrid vehicle,
p∗h
− 2p∗h
(
1
tdh
+
1
t(dg − dh)
)
=
[
−(vh + ch)
tdh
+
((vg − cg)− (vh + ch)))
t(dg − dh)
]
− 2p∗h
(
dg
tdh(dg − dh)
)
=
[− (vh + ch) (dg − dh) + dh((vg − cg)− (vh + ch))
tdh(dg − dh)
]
− 2p∗h
(
dg
tdh(dg − dh)
)
=
[−dg (vh + ch) + dh(vg − cg)
tdh(dg − dh)
]
p∗h =
[
dg (vh + ch)− dh(vg − cg)
2dg
]
p∗h =
(vh + ch)
2
− dh(vg − cg)
2dg
A.3.2 Comparative Statics Analysis of the Monopoly Hybrid
Vehicle Price
We take the partial derivative of p∗h with respect to dg to get
∂p∗h(v, c, d)
∂dg
=
dh(vg − cg)
2dg
2 > 0
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The partial derivative with respect to dh is given by
∂p∗h(v, c, d)
∂dh
=
−(vg − cg)
2dg
< 0
The sign of partial derivative with respect to cg is
∂p∗h(v, c, d)
∂dh
=
dh
2dg
> 0
Similarly, the sign of partial derivative with respect to ch is given by
∂p∗h(v, c, d)
∂ch
=
1
2
> 0
We find the sign of partial derivative with respect to vg as
∂p∗h(v, c, d)
∂vg
= − dh
2dg
< 0
We find the sign of partial derivative with respect to vh as
∂p∗h(v, c, d)
∂vh
=
1
2
> 0
A.4 Comparative Statics Analysis of the Total
Environmental Damage
Three functional forms of are assumed. First, γ is uniformly distributed on [0,1]
so that F (γ) = γ and f(γ) = 1. Second, we use generalized uniform distribution:
F (γ) = γ2 and f(γ) = 2γ. Finally we use another generalized uniform distribution
of F (γ) = γ1/2 and f(γ) = 1
2
γ−1/2.
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A.4.1 A Perfectly Competitive Automobile Market Case
E =
γIC∫
0
[f(γ) · dg]dγ +
γIRH∫
γIC
[f(γ) · dh]dγ
= dgF (γ
IC) + dh
[
F (γIRh )− F (γIC)
]
where γIRh ≡ vh−chtdh and γIRh ≡
vh−ch
tdh
A.4.1.1 Environmental Damage from a Gasoline Vehicle: dg
∂E
∂dg
= F (γIC)− dg
[
f(γIC)
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)2
)]
+ dh
[
f(γIC)
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)2
)]
= F (γIC)− (dg − dh)
[
f(γIC)
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)2
)]
= F (γIC)−
[
f(γIC)
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)
)]
1) Uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ, f(γ) = 1 and f(γIRh ) = f(γ
IC) = 1
∂E
∂dg
= γIC −
[(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)
)]
= γIC − γIC = 0
2) Generalized uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ2, f(γ) = 2γ and f(γIRh ) > f(γ
IC)
∂E
∂dg
= (γIC)
2 − 2(γIC)2
= −(γIC)2
= −
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)
)2
< 0
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3) Generalized uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ1/2, f(γ) = 1
2
γ−1/2 and f(γIRh ) <
f(γIC)
∂E
∂dg
= (γIC)
1/2 −
[
1
2
(γIC)
−(1/2)
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)
)]
= (γIC)
1/2 −
[
1
2
(γIC)
−(1/2)
(γIC)
]
= (γIC)
1/2 −
[
1
2
(γIC)
(1/2)
]
=
1
2
(γIC)
(1/2)
=
1
2
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)
)1/2
> 0
A.4.1.2 Environmental Damage from a Hybrid Vehicle: dh
∂E
∂dh
= dg
[
f(γIC)
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)2
)]
+
[
F (γIRh )− F (γIC)
]
+ dh
[
−f(γIRh )
(
vh − ch
tdh
2
)
−
[
f(γIC)
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)2
)]]
=
[
F (γIRh )− F (γIC)
]
+ (dg − dh)
[
f(γIC)
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)2
)]
− dh
[
f(γIRh )
(
vh − ch
tdh
2
)]
=
[
F (γIRh )− F (γIC)
]
+
[
f(γIC)
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)
)]
−
[
f(γIRh )
(
vh − ch
tdh
)]
1) Uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ, f(γ) = 1 and f(γIRh ) = f(γ
IC) = 1
∂E
∂dh
= γIRh − γIC + γIC − γIRh = 0
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2) Generalized uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ2, f(γ) = 2γ and f(γIRh ) > f(γ
IC)
∂E
∂dh
=
[
F (γIRh )− F (γIC)
]
+ 2(γIC)
2 − 2(γIRh )2
=
[
F (γIRh )− F (γIC)
]
+ 2F (γIC)− 2F (γIRh )
= − [F (γIRh )− F (γIC)] = − [(γIRh )2 − (γIC)2]
= −
[(
vh − ch
tdh
)2
−
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)
)2]
< 0
3) Generalized uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ1/2, f(γ) = 1
2
γ−1/2 and f(γIRh ) <
f(γIC)
∂E
∂dh
= (γIRh )
1/2 − (γIC)1/2 +
(
1
2
(γIC)
−(1/2)
(γIC)
)
−
(
1
2
(γIRh )
−(1/2)
(γIRh )
)
= (γIRh )
1/2 − (γIC)1/2 +
(
1
2
(γIC)
1/2
)
−
(
1
2
(γIRh )
1/2
)
=
1
2
(
(γIRh )
1/2 − (γIC)1/2
)
=
1
2
[(
vh − ch
tdh
)1/2
−
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)
)1/2]
> 0
A.4.1.3 Price of a Gasoline Vehicle: cg
∂E
∂cg
= dg
[
f(γIC)
( −1
t(dg − dh)
)]
+ dh
[
f(γIC)
(
1
t(dg − dh)
)]
= −(dg − dh)
[
f(γIC)
(
1
t(dg − dh)
)]
= −f(γ
IC)
t
< 0
1) Uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ, f(γ) = 1 and f(γIRh ) = f(γ
IC) = 1
∂E
∂cg
= −1
t
< 0
2) Generalized uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ2, f(γ) = 2γ and f(γIRh ) > f(γ
IC)
∂E
∂cg
= −2(γ
IC)
t
= −2
t
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)
)
< 0
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3) Generalized uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ1/2, f(γ) = 1
2
γ−1/2 and f(γIRh ) <
f(γIC)
∂E
∂cg
= −(γ
IC)
−(1/2)
2t
= − 1
2t
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)
)−(1/2)
< 0
A.4.1.4 Price of a Hybrid Vehicle: ch
∂E
∂ch
= dg
[
f(γIC)
(
1
t(dg − dh)
)]
+ dh
[
f(γIRh )
(−1
tdh
)
− f(γIC)
(
1
t(dg − dh)
)]
= (dg − dh)
[
f(γIC)
(
1
t(dg − dh)
)]
− dh
[
f(γIRh )
(
1
tdh
)]
= −
(
f(γIRh )− f(γIC)
t
)
1) Uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ, f(γ) = 1 and f(γIRh ) = f(γ
IC) = 1
∂E
∂ch
= −
(
f(γIRh )− f(γIC)
t
)
= 0
2) Generalized uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ2, f(γ) = 2γ and f(γIRh ) > f(γ
IC)
∂E
∂ch
= −2
t
(
(γIRh )− (γIC)
)
= −2
t
[(
vh − ch
tdh
)
−
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)
)]
< 0
3) Generalized uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ1/2, f(γ) = 1
2
γ−1/2 and f(γIRh ) <
f(γIC)
∂E
∂ch
= − 1
2t
(
(γIRh )
−(1/2) − (γIC)−(1/2)
)
= − 1
2t
[(
vh − ch
tdh
)−(1/2)
−
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)
)−(1/2)]
> 0
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A.4.1.5 Quality of a Gasoline Vehicle: vg
∂E
∂vg
= dg
[
f(γIC)
(
1
t(dg − dh)
)]
− dh
[
f(γIC)
(
1
t(dg − dh)
)]
= (dg − dh)
[
f(γIC)
(
1
t(dg − dh)
)]
=
f(γIC)
t
> 0
1) Uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ, f(γ) = 1 and f(γIRh ) = f(γ
IC) = 1
∂E
∂vg
=
1
t
> 0
2) Generalized uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ2, f(γ) = 2γ and f(γIRh ) > f(γ
IC)
∂E
∂vg
=
2(γIC)
t
=
2
t
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)
)
> 0
3) Generalized uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ1/2, f(γ) = 1
2
γ−1/2 and f(γIRh ) <
f(γIC)
∂E
∂vg
=
(γIC)
−(1/2)
2t
=
1
2t
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)
)−(1/2)
> 0
A.4.1.6 Quality of a Hybrid Vehicle: vh
∂E
∂vh
= dg
[
f(γIC)
( −1
t(dg − dh)
)]
+ dh
[
f(γIRh )
1
tdh
− f(γIC)
( −1
t(dg − dh)
)]
= −(dg − dh)
[
f(γIC)
(
1
t(dg − dh)
)]
+ dh
[
f(γIRh )
1
tdh
]
=
− [f(γIC)− f(γIRh )]
t
=
f(γIRh )− f(γIC)
t
1) Uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ, f(γ) = 1 and f(γIRh ) = f(γ
IC) = 1
∂E
∂vh
=
f(γIRh )− f(γIC)
t
= 0
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2) Generalized uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ2, f(γ) = 2γ and f(γIRh ) > f(γ
IC)
∂E
∂vh
=
2
t
(
(γIRh )− (γIC)
)
=
2
t
[(
vh − ch
tdh
)
−
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)
)]
> 0
3) Generalized uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ1/2, f(γ) = 1
2
γ−1/2 and f(γIRh ) <
f(γIC)
∂E
∂vh
=
1
2t
(
(γIRh )
−(1/2) − (γIC)−(1/2)
)
=
1
2t
[(
vh − ch
tdh
)−(1/2)
−
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)
)−(1/2)]
< 0
A.4.1.7 Environmental Preference Scalar: t
∂E
∂t
= dg
[
f(γIC)
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
−t2(dg − dh)
)]
+ dh
[
f(γIRh )
(
(vh − ch)
−t2dh
)
+
[
f(γIC)
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t2(dg − dh)
)]]
= −(dg − dh)
[
f(γIC)
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t2(dg − dh)
)]
− dh
[
f(γIRh )
(
(vh − ch)
t2dh
)]
= −
[
f(γIC) ((vg − cg)− (vh − ch))
t2
]
−
[
f(γIRh )(vh − ch)
t2
]
= − 1
t2
[
f(γIC) ((vg − cg)− (vh − ch)) + f(γIRh )(vh − ch)
]
1) Uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ, f(γ) = 1 and f(γIRh ) = f(γ
IC) = 1
∂E
∂t
= −(vg − cg)
t2
< 0
2) Generalized uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ2, f(γ) = 2γ and f(γIRh ) > f(γ
IC)
∂E
∂t
= − 1
t2
[
2(γIC) ((vg − cg)− (vh − ch)) + 2(γIRh )(vh − ch)
]
= − 2
t2
[
((vg − cg)− (vh − ch))2
t(dg − dh) +
(vh − ch)2
tdh
]
< 0
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3) Generalized uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ1/2, f(γ) = 1
2
γ−1/2 and f(γIRh ) <
f(γIC)
∂E
∂t
= − 1
t2
[
1
2
(γIC)
−(1/2)
((vg − cg)− (vh − ch)) + 1
2
(γIRh )
−(1/2)
(vh − ch)
]
= − 1
2t2

(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)
)−(1/2)
((vg − cg)− (vh − ch))
+
(
(vh − ch)
tdh
)−(1/2)
(vh − ch)
 < 0
A.4.1.8 Government Subsidy: sh
E =
γIC∫
0
[f(γ) · dg]dγ +
γIRH∫
γIC
[f(γ) · dh]dγ
= dgF (γ
IC) + dh
[
F (γIRh )− F (γIC)
]
where γIC ≡ (vg−cg)−(vh−ch+sh)
t(dg−dh) and γ
IR
h ≡ vh−ch+shtdh
∂E
∂sh
= −dg
[
f(γIC)
(
1
t(dg − dh)
)]
+ dh
[
f(γIRh )
(
1
tdh
)
+ f(γIC)
(
1
t(dg − dh)
)]
= −(dg − dh)
[
f(γIC)
(
1
t(dg − dh)
)]
+ dh
[
f(γIRh )
(
1
tdh
)]
=
(
f(γIRh )− f(γIC)
t
)
1) Uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ, f(γ) = 1 and f(γIRh ) = f(γ
IC) = 1
∂E
∂sh
=
(
f(γIRh )− f(γIC)
t
)
= 0
2) Generalized uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ2, f(γ) = 2γ and f(γIRh ) > f(γ
IC)
∂E
∂sh
=
2
t
(
(γIRh )− (γIC)
)
=
2
t
[(
vh − ch
tdh
)
−
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)
)]
> 0
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3) Generalized uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ1/2, f(γ) = 1
2
γ−1/2 and f(γIRh ) <
f(γIC)
∂E
∂sh
=
1
2t
(
(γIRh )
−(1/2) − (γIC)−(1/2)
)
=
1
2t
[(
vh − ch
tdh
)−(1/2)
−
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)
)−(1/2)]
< 0
A.4.2 The Hybrid Vehicle Monopolist Case
E =
γIC∫
0
[f(γ) · dg]dγ +
γIRH∫
γIC
[f(γ) · dh]dγ
= dgF (γ
IC) + dh
[
F (γIRh )− F (γIC)
]
where γIRh =
dh(vg−cg)+dg(vh−ch)
2tdgdh
and γIC = (2dg−dh)(vg−cg)−dg(vh−ch)
2tdg(dg−dh)
A.4.2.1 Environmental Damage from a Gasoline Vehicle: dg
∂E
∂dg
= F (γIC)− dg
[
f(γIC)
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)2
)]
+ dh
[
f(γIC)
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)2
)]
= F (γIC)− (dg − dh)
[
f(γIC)
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)2
)]
= F (γIC)−
[
f(γIC)
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)
)]
1) Uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ, f(γ) = 1 and f(γIRh ) = f(γ
IC) = 1
∂E
∂dg
= γIC −
[(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)
)]
= γIC − γIC = 0
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2) Generalized uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ2, f(γ) = 2γ and f(γIRh ) > f(γ
IC)
∂E
∂dg
= (γIC)
2 − 2(γIC)2
= −(γIC)2
= −
(
(2dg − dh)(vg − cg)− dg(vh − ch)
2tdg(dg − dh)
)2
< 0
3) Generalized uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ1/2, f(γ) = 1
2
γ−1/2 and f(γIRh ) <
f(γIC)
∂E
∂dg
= (γIC)
1/2 −
[
1
2
(γIC)
−(1/2)
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)
)]
= (γIC)
1/2 −
[
1
2
(γIC)
−(1/2)
(γIC)
]
= (γIC)
1/2 −
[
1
2
(γIC)
(1/2)
]
=
1
2
(γIC)
(1/2)
=
1
2
(
(2dg − dh)(vg − cg)− dg(vh − ch)
2tdg(dg − dh)
)1/2
> 0
A.4.2.2 Environmental Damage from a Hybrid Vehicle: dh
∂E
∂dh
= dg
[
f(γIC)
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)2
)]
+
[
F (γIRh )− F (γIC)
]
+ dh
[
−f(γIRh )
(
vh − ch
tdh
2
)
−
[
f(γIC)
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)2
)]]
=
[
F (γIRh )− F (γIC)
]
+ (dg − dh)
[
f(γIC)
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)2
)]
− dh
[
f(γIRh )
(
vh − ch
tdh
2
)]
=
[
F (γIRh )− F (γIC)
]
+
[
f(γIC)
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)
)]
−
[
f(γIRh )
(
vh − ch
tdh
)]
1) Uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ, f(γ) = 1 and f(γIRh ) = f(γ
IC) = 1
∂E
∂dh
= γIRh − γIC + γIC − γIRh = 0
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2) Generalized uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ2, f(γ) = 2γ and f(γIRh ) > f(γ
IC)
∂E
∂dh
=
[
F (γIRh )− F (γIC)
]
+ 2(γIC)
2 − 2(γIRh )2
=
[
F (γIRh )− F (γIC)
]
+ 2F (γIC)− 2F (γIRh )
= − [F (γIRh )− F (γIC)] = − [(γIRh )2 − (γIC)2]
= −
[(
vh − ch
tdh
)2
−
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t(dg − dh)
)2]
< 0
3) Generalized uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ1/2, f(γ) = 1
2
γ−1/2 and f(γIRh ) <
f(γIC)
∂E
∂dh
= (γIRh )
1/2 − (γIC)1/2 +
(
1
2
(γIC)
−(1/2)
(γIC)
)
−
(
1
2
(γIRh )
−(1/2)
(γIRh )
)
= (γIRh )
1/2 − (γIC)1/2 +
(
1
2
(γIC)
1/2
)
−
(
1
2
(γIRh )
1/2
)
=
1
2
(
(γIRh )
1/2 − (γIC)1/2
)
=
1
2
[(
dh(vg − cg) + dg(vh − ch)
2tdgdh
)2
−
(
(2dg − dh)(vg − cg)− dg(vh − ch)
2tdg(dg − dh)
)2]
> 0
A.4.2.3 Price of a Gasoline Vehicle: cg
∂E
∂cg
= dg
[
f(γIC)
( −1
t(dg − dh)
)]
+ dh
[
f(γIC)
(
1
t(dg − dh)
)]
= −(dg − dh)
[
f(γIC)
(
1
t(dg − dh)
)]
= −f(γ
IC)
t
< 0
1) Uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ, f(γ) = 1 and f(γIRh ) = f(γ
IC) = 1
∂E
∂cg
= −1
t
< 0
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2) Generalized uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ2, f(γ) = 2γ and f(γIRh ) > f(γ
IC)
∂E
∂cg
= −2(γ
IC)
t
= −2
t
(
(2dg − dh)(vg − cg)− dg(vh − ch)
2tdg(dg − dh)
)
< 0
3) Generalized uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ1/2, f(γ) = 1
2
γ−1/2 and f(γIRh ) <
f(γIC)
∂E
∂cg
= −2(γ
IC)
t
= −2
t
(
(2dg − dh)(vg − cg)− dg(vh − ch)
2tdg(dg − dh)
)
< 0
A.4.2.4 Cost of a Hybrid Vehicle: ch
∂E
∂ch
= dg
[
f(γIC)
(
1
t(dg − dh)
)]
+ dh
[
f(γIRh )
(−1
tdh
)
− f(γIC)
(
1
t(dg − dh)
)]
= (dg − dh)
[
f(γIC)
(
1
t(dg − dh)
)]
− dh
[
f(γIRh )
(
1
tdh
)]
= −
(
f(γIRh )− f(γIC)
t
)
1) Uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ, f(γ) = 1 and f(γIRh ) = f(γ
IC) = 1
∂E
∂ch
= −
(
f(γIRh )− f(γIC)
t
)
= 0
2) Generalized uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ2, f(γ) = 2γ and f(γIRh ) > f(γ
IC)
∂E
∂ch
= −2
t
(
(γIRh )− (γIC)
)
= −2
t

(
dh(vg − cg) + dg(vh − ch)
2tdgdh
)
−
(
(2dg − dh)(vg − cg)− dg(vh − ch)
2tdg(dg − dh)
)−(1/2)
 < 0
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3) Generalized uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ1/2, f(γ) = 1
2
γ−1/2 and f(γIRh ) <
f(γIC)
∂E
∂ch
= − 1
2t
(
(γIRh )
−(1/2) − (γIC)−(1/2)
)
= − 1
2t

(
dh(vg − cg) + dg(vh − ch)
2tdgdh
)−(1/2)
−
(
(2dg − dh)(vg − cg)− dg(vh − ch)
2tdg(dg − dh)
)−(1/2)
 > 0
A.4.2.5 Quality of a Gasoline Vehicle: vg
∂E
∂vg
= dg
[
f(γIC)
(
1
t(dg − dh)
)]
− dh
[
f(γIC)
(
1
t(dg − dh)
)]
= (dg − dh)
[
f(γIC)
(
1
t(dg − dh)
)]
=
f(γIC)
t
> 0
1) Uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ, f(γ) = 1 and f(γIRh ) = f(γ
IC) = 1
∂E
∂vg
=
1
t
> 0
2) Generalized uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ2, f(γ) = 2γ and f(γIRh ) > f(γ
IC)
∂E
∂vg
=
2(γIC)
t
=
2
t
(
(2dg − dh)(vg − cg)− dg(vh − ch)
2tdg(dg − dh)
)
> 0
3) Generalized uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ1/2, f(γ) = 1
2
γ−1/2 and f(γIRh ) <
f(γIC)
∂E
∂vg
=
(γIC)
−(1/2)
2t
=
1
2t
(
(2dg − dh)(vg − cg)− dg(vh − ch)
2tdg(dg − dh)
)−(1/2)
> 0
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A.4.2.6 Quality of a Hybrid Vehicle: vh
∂E
∂vh
= dg
[
f(γIC)
( −1
t(dg − dh)
)]
+ dh
[
f(γIRh )
1
tdh
− f(γIC)
( −1
t(dg − dh)
)]
= −(dg − dh)
[
f(γIC)
(
1
t(dg − dh)
)]
+ dh
[
f(γIRh )
1
tdh
]
=
− [f(γIC)− f(γIRh )]
t
=
f(γIRh )− f(γIC)
t
1) Uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ, f(γ) = 1 and f(γIRh ) = f(γ
IC) = 1
∂E
∂vh
=
f(γIRh )− f(γIC)
t
= 0
2) Generalized uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ2, f(γ) = 2γ and f(γIRh ) > f(γ
IC)
∂E
∂vh
=
2
t
(
(γIRh )− (γIC)
)
=
2
t
[(
dh(vg − cg) + dg(vh − ch)
2tdgdh
)
−
(
(2dg − dh)(vg − cg)− dg(vh − ch)
2tdg(dg − dh)
)]
> 0
3) Generalized uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ1/2, f(γ) = 1
2
γ−1/2 and f(γIRh ) <
f(γIC)
∂E
∂vh
=
1
2t
(
(γIRh )
−(1/2) − (γIC)−(1/2)
)
=
1
2t

(
dh(vg − cg) + dg(vh − ch)
2tdgdh
)−(1/2)
−
(
(2dg − dh)(vg − cg)− dg(vh − ch)
2tdg(dg − dh)
)−(1/2)
 < 0
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A.4.2.7 Environmental Preference Scalar: t
∂E
∂t
= dg
[
f(γIC)
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
−t2(dg − dh)
)]
+ dh
[
f(γIRh )
(
(vh − ch)
−t2dh
)
+
[
f(γIC)
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t2(dg − dh)
)]]
= −(dg − dh)
[
f(γIC)
(
(vg − cg)− (vh − ch)
t2(dg − dh)
)]
− dh
[
f(γIRh )
(
(vh − ch)
t2dh
)]
= −
[
f(γIC) ((vg − cg)− (vh − ch))
t2
]
−
[
f(γIRh )(vh − ch)
t2
]
= − 1
t2
[
f(γIC) ((vg − cg)− (vh − ch)) + f(γIRh )(vh − ch)
]
1) Uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ, f(γ) = 1 and f(γIRh ) = f(γ
IC) = 1
∂E
∂t
= −(vg − cg)
t2
< 0
2) Generalized uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ2, f(γ) = 2γ and f(γIRh ) > f(γ
IC)
∂E
∂t
= − 1
t2
[
2(γIC) ((vg − cg)− (vh − ch)) + 2(γIRh )(vh − ch)
]
= − 2
t2

(
(2dg − dh)(vg − cg)− dg(vh − ch)
2tdg(dg − dh)
)
((vg − cg)− (vh − ch))
+
(
dh(vg − cg) + dg(vh − ch)
2tdgdh
)
(vh − ch)

= − 1
t2

(
(2dg − dh)(vg − cg)− dg(vh − ch)
tdg(dg − dh)
)
((vg − cg)− (vh − ch))
+
(
dh(vg − cg) + dg(vh − ch)
tdgdh
)
(vh − ch)
 < 0
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3) Generalized uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ1/2, f(γ) = 1
2
γ−1/2 and f(γIRh ) <
f(γIC)
∂E
∂t
= − 1
t2
[
1
2
(γIC)
−(1/2)
((vg − cg)− (vh − ch)) + 1
2
(γIRh )
−(1/2)
(vh − ch)
]
= − 1
2t2

(
(2dg − dh)(vg − cg)− dg(vh − ch)
2tdg(dg − dh)
)−(1/2)
((vg − cg)− (vh − ch))
+
(
dh(vg − cg) + dg(vh − ch)
2tdgdh
)−(1/2)
(vh − ch)
 < 0
A.4.2.8 Government Subsidy: sh
E =
γIC∫
0
[f(γ) · dg]dγ +
γIRH∫
γIC
[f(γ) · dh]dγ
= dgF (γ
IC) + dh
[
F (γIRh )− F (γIC)
]
where γIC = (2dg−dh)(vg−cg)−dg(vh−ch+sh)
2tdg(dg−dh) and γ
IR
h =
dh(vg−cg)+dg(vh−ch+sh)
2tdgdh
∂E
∂sh
= −dg
[
f(γIC)
(
1
t(dg − dh)
)]
+ dh
[
f(γIRh )
(
1
tdh
)
+ f(γIC)
(
1
t(dg − dh)
)]
= −(dg − dh)
[
f(γIC)
(
1
t(dg − dh)
)]
+ dh
[
f(γIRh )
(
1
tdh
)]
=
(
f(γIRh )− f(γIC)
t
)
1) Uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ, f(γ) = 1 and f(γIRh ) = f(γ
IC) = 1
∂E
∂sh
=
(
f(γIRh )− f(γIC)
t
)
= 0
2) Generalized uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ2, f(γ) = 2γ and f(γIRh ) > f(γ
IC)
∂E
∂sh
=
2
t
(
(γIRh )− (γIC)
)
=
2
t
[(
dh(vg − cg) + dg(vh − ch)
2tdgdh
)
−
(
(2dg − dh)(vg − cg)− dg(vh − ch)
2tdg(dg − dh)
)]
> 0
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3) Generalized uniform distribution: F (γ) = γ1/2, f(γ) = 1
2
γ−1/2 and f(γIRh ) <
f(γIC)
∂E
∂sh
=
1
2t
(
(γIRh )
−(1/2) − (γIC)−(1/2)
)
=
1
2t

(
dh(vg − cg) + dg(vh − ch)
2tdgdh
)−(1/2)
−
(
(2dg − dh)(vg − cg)− dg(vh − ch)
2tdg(dg − dh)
)−(1/2)
 < 0
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